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The copyright troll and the phenomenon of copyright trolling have 
thus far received surprisingly little attention in discussions of copyright law 
and policy. A copyright troll refers to an entity that acquires a tailored 
interest in a copyrighted work with the sole objective of enforcing claims 
relating to that work against copiers in a zealous and dogmatic manner. 
Not being a creator, distributor, performer, or indeed user of the protected 
work, the copyright troll operates entirely in the market for copyright 
claims. With specialized skills in monitoring and enforcing copyright 
infringement, the troll is able to lower its litigation costs, enabling it to 
bring claims against defendants that an ordinary copyright owner might 
have chosen not to. 
As a matter of law, the copyright troll’s model usually complies with 
all of copyright’s formal rules. Courts have as a result struggled to find a 
coherent legal basis on which to curb the copyright troll. In this Article, I 
show that the real problem with the copyright troll originates in the 
connection between copyright’s stated goal of incentivizing creativity and 
the enforcement of copyright claims, which discussions of copyright law 
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and policy fail to adequately capture. Copyright claims, much like other 
private law claims, are systematically underenforced. This 
underenforcement is neither purely fortuitous nor indeed marginal to the 
system, but instead operates as an important safety valve that introduces an 
informal breathing space into copyright’s functioning. Over time, this 
underenforcement results in a balance between claims that are actionable 
and enforced, and those that are actionable but tolerated. It is precisely 
this balance that the advent of the troll disrupts, since it seeks to enforce 
claims that copyright owners would have otherwise tolerated. 
This Article unpacks the connection between the incentive to create 
and the incentive to enforce in copyright to show why the troll’s actions are 
indeed problematic, despite its formal compliance with copyright’s legal 
rules. In so doing, this Article shows how the troll exploits the market for 
copyright claims and argues that a permanent solution to the problem will 
entail targeting the troll’s incentive structure rather than using any of 
copyright’s existing doctrines. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “troll” is becoming a familiar figure in the world of intellectual 
property law. As an idea, it made its first appearance in patent law, where a 
“patent troll” today refers to a nonperforming patent owner who merely 
seeks to enjoin the use of an invention without itself using the invention or 
servicing the market for it—the proverbial “dog in the manger.”1 Indeed, 
during oral argument in a Supreme Court case involving the legal standard 
for patent injunctions, one Justice seemed suitably amused by the term, 
comparing it to a “scary thing” lying in wait for innocent victims under the 
bridge.2 
For all the attention that the troll has received in patent law however, 
its presence in copyright law, together with the allied practice of copyright 
trolling, has been largely ignored. References to “copyright trolls” in the 
literature have in the past been few and far between.3 The idea began to get 
a great deal of attention just this past year, when a Nevada-based company 
by the name of Righthaven LLC (“Righthaven”) came to develop a 
 
 1. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 2111, 2112 (2007) (describing patent trolls as “a class of patent owners who do not provide end 
products or services themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing the work of 
others”); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (discussing what makes a “patent troll”); Ronald J. Mann, 
Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1023 (2005) (same); 
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458 (2012) (same); Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (citing patent trolls as a transaction cost 
that can “stifle commercialization”); James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: 
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 192 
(2006) (describing the characteristics of a “patent troll”); Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under 
the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent 
Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 165 (2008) (same); Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An 
Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (same). 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 
05-130). 
 3. For some early usage of the term, see John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 550 (2007) (“One can readily imagine a 
future dystopian world where the record labels, long since irrelevant to the development and 
distribution of new music, become nothing more than copyright trolls, drawing their revenue entirely 
from collections [of licensing rights].”), and Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to 
Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 11–12 (2008). 
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business model that revolved around enforcing third party copyright claims 
against infringers, claims in which it had no more than an artificially 
tailored assignment of rights.4 In essence, Righthaven’s model was 
premised on buying one of the creator’s several rights to exclude from the 
bundle of exclusive rights that copyright law grants every creator and 
enforcing it efficiently, albeit in dogmatic fashion. 
Interestingly enough though, copyright law has long enabled behavior 
that is only today pejoratively described as “trolling.” In enacting the 
Copyright Act of 1976,5 Congress abandoned the long-held idea that 
copyright’s set of exclusive rights, whenever granted to a creator, was 
fundamentally indivisible. Under this old approach, copyright law was seen 
as granting authors a limited set of exclusive entitlements. In assigning 
these rights, authors could either assign them as a unified whole or not at 
all.6 Any attempt to assign anything less than the whole was treated by the 
law as a mere license, with the assignee / licensee then having no 
independent standing to commence an action for infringement.7 This made 
determining ownership of copyright a relatively simple matter and 
precluded parties from tailoring their contractual arrangements in 
excessively idiosyncratic terms. The Act of 1976, however, consciously 
abandoned this approach by allowing the bundle to be broken up into as 
many rights or mini-rights as the parties deemed necessary during an 
assignment.8 Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, it went one step 
further by creating an affirmative rule of standing, under which an 
exclusive licensee or assignee of any right or mini-right was deemed to be 
the owner of that right and given the ability to commence an action for 
copyright infringement as long as it related to any right covered by the 
contract.9 The Act thus came to recognize the idea of multiple ownership of 
a single work and allowed each owner to hold a narrowly defined and 
 
 4. For Righthaven’s first lawsuit under its business model, see Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, Righthaven LLC v. Moneyreign, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-0350 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2010). For early 
coverage of its strategy, see David Kravets, Newspaper Chain’s New Business Plan: Copyright Suits, 
WIRED (July 22, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/copyright-trolling-for-
dollars/. 
 5. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C.). 
 6. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01[A] (rev. ed. 
2012); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 564 (2010); Elliot Groffman, Comment, Divisibility of Copyright: Its Application and Effect, 
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 171 (1979). 
 7. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.01[A], [C][1]. 
 8. Id. § 10.02[A]; 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006). 
 9. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][1]. 
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limited set of rights.10 
Analytically, this change seemed rather logical at the time. Since use 
and exclusion are taken to be the two primary and interdependent features 
of ownership, characterizing any party that holds both rights together as its 
owner now made perfect sense.11 Yet, by allowing for the unrestricted 
fragmentation of copyright’s bundle of exclusive rights and simultaneously 
endowing it with independent practical significance (standing), the Act 
allowed for a rather significant loophole on the enforcement front. In 
situations where a copyright holder might want to sell its enforcement 
rights (though not use rights) to another party, a practice otherwise 
forbidden under traditional contract and common law rules prohibiting the 
sale of legal claims,12 the parties could now create an exclusive license (or 
assignment) that granted the licensee an artificially tailored use right, which 
would in turn indirectly enable the licensee to commence an action for 
infringement qua owner. Of course, this tailoring of the use right had to 
overlap with the scope of the enforcement sought. But in situations in 
which the target of the enforcement (the putative defendant) had already 
been identified either individually or by class, this posed no problem. The 
copyright holder could create an exclusive license that covered the precise 
activities, time frame, and geographic area of the defendant, and the 
licensee could enforce the copyright on its own, with claims for statutory 
and willful damages. Thus emerged the potential for copyright trolls. 
It was precisely this loophole that Righthaven crafted its entire 
enterprise around, earning it the dubious distinction of becoming copyright 
law’s first anointed “troll.” In less than two years, Righthaven managed to 
bring more than 275 cases of copyright infringement against defendants, 
settling many of these cases or succeeding in obtaining statutory damages 
from courts.13 Its success in these actions in turn resulted in an outpouring 
of criticism from different corners.14 
 
 10. Id. § 12.02; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”). 
 11. For an elaborate discussion of the use-exclusion connection in property law, see J.E. PENNER, 
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68 (1997). 
 12. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816, 816 
(1916); infra Part II. The prohibition is thought to emanate from the common law rules against 
champerty and maintenance. For a recent overview of the prohibition, see Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim 
Is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1286–1301 (2011). 
 13. For a comprehensive list of these cases, see Comprehensive List of Copyright Infringement 
Lawsuits Filed by Righthaven, LLC, RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, 
http://www.righthavenlawsuits.com/lawsuits.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
Comprehensive List]. 
 14. See, e.g., Susan Beck, “Copyright Troll” Righthaven Passes Early Federal Court Test, AM. 
LAW. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202471807253 
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On the face of things though, it is not readily apparent why a 
copyright owner’s delegation of the enforcement of its exclusionary rights 
to another entity with special expertise in that task ought to be seen as 
problematic. The delegation solves what economists call the principal-
agent problem by allowing for the perfect alignment of the agent’s 
incentives with those of the principal, through the mechanism of divided 
ownership.15 Additionally, the law’s historical reluctance to allow for the 
free alienability of legal claims to third parties that are better positioned to 
enforce them has long been thought to lack a suitably strong explanation.16 
If a right is violated, and its enforcement is therefore the subject of a 
perfectly valid legal claim, why should it matter exactly who commences 
the legal action, as long as the original right-holder obtains some direct or 
indirect benefit from the enforcement? Scholars have continued to make 
this argument in response to the law’s prohibition on the alienation of legal 
claims;17 and yet, when copyright law now seems to have indirectly 
allowed for just such alienation, it is seen as deeply problematic. Despite 
the voluminous media coverage that Righthaven’s activities as a troll 
received, the precise legal, theoretical, or policy reasons for the purported 
illegitimacy of its business model have received surprisingly little attention. 
Indeed, much of the rhetoric surrounding Righthaven’s actions as a troll 
seemed to stem from the perceived unfairness of today’s copyright laws, 
around which its enforcement model was built.18 
In this Article, I argue that the real reasons why allowing copyright 
owners to outsource and delegate the enforcement of their rights to third 
parties (trolls) such as Righthaven is troublesome originate in its disruption 
 
&slreturn=20130313204837; Jay Fitzgerald, Legal Shark Sues Boston Bloggers, BOS. HERALD, Aug. 8, 
2010, http://www.bostonherald.com/business/general/view/20100808legal_shark_sues_boston_ 
bloggers_las_vegas_paper_sells_news_content_to_lawyer; Joe Mullin, Is This the Birth of the 
Copyright Troll?, LAW.COM (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 
1202466627090&Is_This_the_Birth_of_the_Copyright_Troll; Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Attack Dog’ 
Group Buys Newspaper Copyrights, Sues 86 Websites, AM. BAR. ASS’N J. (Aug. 4, 2010, 6:34 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/attack_dog_group_buys_newspaper_copyrights_sues_86_we
bsites. 
 15. For a general overview of the agency cost problem, see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID 
MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 2–3 (2002). 
 16. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 703–57 
(2005) (“[A]s traditionally formulated, the apparently most formidable objections to claim sales are not 
powerful.”); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 120–22 (2011) (“U.S. 
courts have never been shy about admitting that the earliest justifications for limitations on assignment 
and champerty has almost no relevance to contemporary life.”). 
 17. Sebok, supra note 16, at 132–33. 
 18. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 14; Fitzgerald, supra note 14; Mullin, supra note 14; Weiss, supra 
note 14. 
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of an enforcement equilibrium that is integral to the functioning of 
copyright as an institution. While structured along the lines of a property 
right, copyright law embodies a deep instrumentalism—relating to the 
encouragement of creativity—that is manifested both in the working of its 
individual doctrines as well as in the way in which these doctrines interact 
with each other as an ensemble. Copyright law however consciously 
chooses to realize this instrumental goal through the vehicle of private 
enforcement, which explains why it is structured as a regime of private 
law.19 And as with most regimes of private enforcement, realization of the 
institution’s social goals depends on their alignment with the enforcement 
incentives of private actors. Nonetheless, as has been shown to be true in 
innumerable contexts, the enforcement incentives of private actors 
invariably come to be influenced by various costs and considerations 
external to the formal rules of the legal regime.20 The result is often a 
systematic underenforcement of otherwise actionable claims. So it is with 
copyright too, where this manifests itself in the creation of a balance 
between actionable claims of infringement that are actually enforced and 
actionable claims that are instead tolerated and treated as de facto 
noninfringing claims.21 
Copyright claims, much like other private law claims in the areas of 
tort, property, and contract, are thus systematically underenforced.22 It is 
 
 19. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: 
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012) (describing the private law origins 
and structure of copyright law). 
 20. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 
371, 371 (1986) (“Recent work has analyzed the serious deficiencies of this system of private 
enforcement that arise because the costs of operating the legal system create a divergence between 
actual private incentives to sue and those that would lead to socially optimal results.”); Steven Shavell, 
The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 575, 577–79 (1997) [hereinafter Shavell, Fundamental Divergence] (basing the argument 
on the assumption that costs of litigation will affect private incentives to file suit); Steven Shavell, The 
Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 
333–34 (1982) [hereinafter Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive] (stating that the argument 
can be made that multiple social efforts reflect the “problems of otherwise insufficient private motives 
to bring suit”). 
 21. Tim Wu has used the phrase “tolerated use” to describe a set of uses (of copyrighted works) 
that are “technically infringing” but “nonetheless tolerated.” Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 617, 617 (2008). With a few modifications, see infra Part III.B, “actionable but tolerated” uses 
correspond roughly to Wu’s idea of uses that are tolerated by “policies of selective enforcement,” see 
Wu, supra, at 622. 
 22. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1102–
03, 1158–59 (1996) (noting that tort law has high transaction costs and low claim rates); Michael J. 
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1287 (1992) (“At nearly every stage, the tort litigation system operates to 
diminish the likelihood that injurers will have to compensate their victims.”). 
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this equilibrium of underenforcement that the advent of the copyright troll 
threatens to disrupt. Being a complete outsider to the market for creative 
works—in that it is not a producer, distributor, consumer, or indeed user of 
such works—the troll operates on a fundamentally different calculus of 
when to enforce the copyright claim from that of the original copyright 
owners. In essence then, the troll’s actions convert copyright law’s 
previously actionable but tolerated claims into actionable and enforced 
ones, disrupting the implicit equilibrium. 
The problem with the troll however is more than just that it is 
overenforcing copyright. If this were the case, there would indeed be little 
reason to distinguish the troll from any other overzealous copyright owner. 
The unique problem presented by the troll originates in its incentive 
structure. The traditional copyright owner’s decision whether to enforce an 
actionable claim or not is thought to derive primarily (though not 
exclusively) from copyright law’s fundamental purpose as an inducement 
for creativity. Commencing an action for infringement is presumed to be a 
viable option principally when the harm from such infringement interferes 
in some way with (or is likely to interfere with) the market for creative 
works.23 A copyright owner’s decision to sue a copier thus represents the 
belief that the copying in question is harming the owner’s ability to exploit 
the market for the copyrighted work. The incentive to enforce a copyright 
claim is ordinarily thought to track—either directly or indirectly—the very 
purpose for which the copyright system exists, namely, its creation of a 
market-based inducement for creativity. What makes the troll’s disruption 
of the underenforcement equilibrium problematic then is the fact that its 
reasons for doing so bear no relationship whatsoever to the market for 
creative works and derive instead from other unique efficiencies that it is 
positioned to capitalize on. Its incentives to sue for copyright infringement 
emanate from motivations that diverge rather fundamentally from the social 
reasons for the very existence of the copyright system. 
This is where things cease being straightforward. Copyright law’s 
underenforcement equilibrium is maintained entirely through the conscious 
inaction of copyright owners, with absolutely no support from copyright’s 
formal rules and processes. In other words, it is almost never directly 
enforced by courts, but is instead dependent entirely on potential plaintiffs’ 
behavior for its realization. “Actionable but tolerated” claims also fall well 
outside the purview of the fair use doctrine, which by its very nature 
 
 23. Cf. Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive, supra note 20, at 337–38 (arguing that a 
suit is socially desirable if social costs warrant the suit in that particular situation, not just when private 
costs warrant the suit). 
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extends to claims that copyright law recognizes as intrinsically 
nonactionable to begin with.24 As a result, courts struggle to rein in 
copyright trolls and invariably resort to rules and principles that are at best 
indirect ways of addressing the problem. Given that copyright trolls have in 
theory violated none of the law’s formal rules and principles, copyright law 
has thus far failed to articulate a coherent basis on which to curb their 
activities. In the process, the argument against copyright trolls starts 
becoming somewhat murky, since it remains unsupported by legal doctrine 
and instead originates in the overall functioning of the copyright system. It 
is this sense of unease that the rhetoric about copyright trolls continues to 
mask. 
This Article sets out the analytical and normative contours of behavior 
that is pejoratively described as “copyright trolling,” examines the 
strategies that courts have used to curb it, and unbundles the real problems 
underlying such behavior. In so doing, it shows why discussions of 
copyright trolling reveal a sense of unease in their identification of the root 
of the problem and solutions to it. 
Part II starts with an overview of copyright trolling, using the 
Righthaven episode as its paradigm. It sets out the idea of the “copyright 
troll,” shows how copyright law’s principle of “infinite divisibility” 
facilitated the creation of copyright trolls such as Righthaven, describes 
Righthaven’s precise business model and enforcement strategy, and 
concludes by examining how courts eventually reined in Righthaven’s 
actions. 
Part III unpacks the practice of copyright trolling to show how it 
remains problematic as a matter of copyright theory and policy. This part 
argues that copyright law embodies an equilibrium of underenforcement, 
which emanates from its reliance on private enforcement to realize its 
instrumental goals. It is this equilibrium that the troll’s behavior disrupts 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since this equilibrium is maintained 
entirely through private (in)action, the troll’s behavior remains perfectly 
compatible with existing copyright law, thereby making the case against it 
especially hard for both courts and litigants. 
Part IV moves to the prescriptive and suggests that the only way to 
completely disallow copyright trolling will require the formalization of a 
rule that examines the incentives and motives of a claimant seeking 
statutory damages in a copyright infringement action. It concludes by 
 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (describing an act of fair use as copying that “is not an infringement 
of copyright”). 
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suggesting an approach that courts might consider to this end. 
II.  THE COPYRIGHT TROLL 
A copyright troll refers to an entity whose business revolves around 
the systematic legal enforcement of copyrights in which it has acquired a 
limited ownership interest. Much like a patent troll, a copyright troll is 
generally a nonperforming entity, in the sense that it is not a creator, 
distributor, or indeed user of creative expression.25 It operates by obtaining 
an assignmentfor valuable consideration—of one or more legal rights in 
another’s creative work, which it then uses to threaten and bring actions for 
infringement against others. Focused almost entirely on the legal 
enforcement of these rights, it relies either on the threat of litigation to 
force a large monetary settlement or instead proceeds to litigate its rights 
with the sole objective of obtaining damages from a defendant. Having no 
interest in the use or exploitation of the work and dependent entirely on 
settlements and damages for its revenue, a copyright troll is almost never 
satisfied with an order merely enjoining the defendant’s infringing 
activities. 
Englishman Harry Wall is often described as the world’s first 
copyright troll.26 The U.K. Dramatic Copyright Act of 1833 had created a 
system of statutory penalties for the infringement of protected works.27 
Wall developed a business in which he would obtain a power of attorney 
from composers with the sole objective of enforcing their rights, and would 
thereafter go around cities extracting hefty licensing fees and settlements 
from individuals who performed these compositions, threatening them with 
litigation and statutory penalties if they refused to pay up.28 A critic of Wall 
described him as “not car[ing] anything for the work or anything else,” but 
the “money” involved.29 This description of the copyright troll is as true 
today as it was of Wall in the 1800s. The only difference is of course that 
modern copyright trolls’ strategies are far more nuanced and sophisticated. 
This part unpacks the working of copyright trolls as they operate today 
 
 25. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. 
BULL. 1, 1 (2005) (“[Patent trolls] obtain patents, not to make, use, or sell new products and 
technologies, but solely to force third parties to purchase licenses.”). 
 26. Isabella Alexander, ‘Neither Bolt nor Chain, Iron Safe nor Private Watchman, Can Prevent 
the Theft of Words’: The Birth of the Performing Right in Britain, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: 
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 321, 339 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds., 2010). 
 27. The Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15 (U.K.). 
 28. Alexander, supra note 26, at 339–40. 
 29. Id. at 339; Statement of Thomas Chappell Before the Royal Commission on Copyright of 
1878, in ROYAL COMMISSION ON COPYRIGHT: MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 106–09 (1878). 
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under the Copyright Act of 1976. Using the example of Righthaven, it 
illustrates how trolls capitalize on the relaxed rules of assignment, standing, 
and damages under copyright law, and then describes how courts have had 
challenges dealing with them under existing law. 
A.  MOTIVATING THE COPYRIGHT TROLL 
Each element of the copyright troll’s strategy inevitably involves 
exploiting a loophole or feature of the law to its advantage. While each of 
these loopholes may seem minor independently, when taken as a whole, 
they collectively make for a robust business model. This section examines 
the three main features of the Copyright Act of 1976, which when put 
together, actively facilitate the emergence of copyright trolls. Indeed, in 
some ways it is surprising that it took trolls a good three decades to fully 
exploit these features and develop their business models. 
1.  Independent Standing to Sue 
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, only the proprietor of a copyright 
could bring an action for infringement, and only an author or the author’s 
assignee was deemed a proprietor.30 A licensee, even if exclusive, could 
bring an action only by joining the proprietor as a party to the action—
either voluntarily or involuntarily.31 This created an obvious problem for 
potential trolls, since it necessitated either the copyright proprietor 
cooperating with the troll (in a voluntary joinder) or the troll running the 
risk of antagonizing the proprietor (in an involuntary joinder), which could 
jeopardize its entire business. This limitation on standing thus created an 
obvious obstacle to the emergence of trolls, and courts for their part, 
enforced this limit in legitimately rigid fashion.32 
 
 30. Manning v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Borden v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 28 F. Supp. 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[A]. 
 31. Followay Prods., Inc. v. Maurer, 603 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1979); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 6, § 12.02[A]. 
 32. See, e.g., Buck v. Elm Lodge, Inc., 83 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1936) (“In the case at bar, the 
society, as exclusive licensee of the right to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit, could not 
sue for infringement without joining the owner of the copyright.”); Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells 
Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 11–12 (2d Cir. 1922) (reversing injunction placed on infringing film on the grounds 
that the plaintiff “own[ed] less than the whole” copyright); Ed Brawley, Inc. v. Gaffney, 399 F. Supp. 
115, 116 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (“It has been held repeatedly and consistently that a nonexclusive licensee 
may not bring an action on a copyright infringement unless the licensor, the proprietor, of the copyright 
is joined as a plaintiff.”); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (“A person 
to whom has been transferred only a limited right is a mere licensee of the particular right, and, as such, 
is not empowered to sue alone for violation of the copyright.”); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Powers, 56 F. 
Supp. 751, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (granting motion to dismiss on grounds that the plaintiff was a mere 
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The Act of 1976, however, altered this drastically, primarily in order 
to give effect to its principle of unlimited divisibility, discussed below. 
Under the new rules too, only the owner of a right granted by copyright 
was permitted to bring an action for infringement.33 However, the 
definition of an owner was altered to recognize exclusive licensees as 
copyright owners as well.34 Nonexclusive licensees were still prohibited 
from bringing actions.35 For trolls, this now meant that they would have to 
do no more than obtain an exclusive license from a creator-owner to be 
entitled to commence an action. They no longer had to make the licensor a 
party to the action; indeed, under the new rules, the licensor (of an 
exclusive license) was actively precluded from bringing an action. 
On the face of things, the inclusion of exclusive licensees into the 
category of owners made perfect sense. By itself, it continued to emphasize 
the idea that exclusivity by its very nature implied the existence of no more 
than one owner. It thus merely moved the ability to commence an action 
from licensor to licensee in an exclusive transaction. The most pernicious 
effects of this rule were however felt only when exercised in conjunction 
with the Act’s allowance for the disaggregation of copyright’s bundle of 
rights. 
2.  Copyright’s Disaggregative Bundle of Rights 
The troll’s strongest impetus for its business model came from the 
Act’s new rules on the divisibility of copyright’s exclusive rights. Whereas 
the Act of 1909 had allowed copyright owners to either assign their rights 
in the work in their entirety, or run the risk of assignments being treated as 
mere licenses36—the 1976 Act now allowed for “[a]ny of the exclusive 
rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the 
 
licensee of copyright and not an assignee); Eliot v. Geare-Marston, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301, 306–07 (E.D. 
Pa. 1939) (detailing how one plaintiff was unable to recover damages because that plaintiff did not own 
the full copyright and thus had no standing); Douglas v. Cunningham, 33 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470 (D. 
Mass. 1933) (granting motion to dismiss copyright infringement claim because the plaintiff was not the 
owner of the entire copyright).  
 33. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B]. 
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”). 
 35. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1982); 3 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B] (“Thus, a nonexclusive licensee has no more standing to 
sue at present than was the case under the 1909 Act.”). 
 36. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.01[A] (noting how the rule rendered it “impossible 
to ‘assign’ anything less than the totality of rights commanded by copyright”). For cases treating a 
partial assignment as a license, see Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002); P.C. Films 
Corp. v. MGM/UA Home Video Inc., 138 F.3d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1998); Hirshon v. United Artists 
Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957); and Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 282 F. at 10. 
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rights” to be “transferred” and “owned separately.”37 The owner of a 
particular right was entitled to all the protections and remedies of the law as 
it related to that right.38 
Together with the new rules on standing, this changed things quite 
significantly. First, it permitted the owner of an individual right to 
commence an action for infringement of that particular right. And by 
treating an exclusive licensee of a right as its owner, in effect it now 
allowed the exclusive licensee of a specific right to bring an action for 
infringement of that right.39 Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Act 
expressly permitted both natural and artificial divisions of the bundle. Not 
only could copyright’s set of six enumerated rights be partitioned during a 
transfer, but parties were now free to create artificial subdivisions of them 
as well. These subdivisions could be temporal, geographic, or relate to 
particular markets for the work (for example, hardback editions rather than 
paperback).40 In each instance, the ownership interest extended only to the 
narrow subdivision specified in the grant, but that subdivision itself could 
be tailored in as many idiosyncratic ways as possible.41 
In essence then, copyright’s model of rights came to resemble what 
property scholars have for long described as the “bundle of rights” picture 
of property, under which property is thought to consist in an infinite set of 
rights and privileges that relate to a particular resource.42 The exact content 
of this bundle is impossible to ascertain in advance, but its depletion and 
disaggregation can be determined analytically ex post. The content of the 
bundle is thus only ever ascertained when it is broken down into its 
constituent elements, and hence the term “disaggregative” to describe it.43 
Notwithstanding the Act’s allowance for the infinite divisibility of the 
bundle, it continued to emphasize an important restriction on this principle. 
The divisibility could extend only to the rights specifically enumerated in 
 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B][1]. 
 40. Id. § 10.02[A] (discussing various temporal, geographic, and subject-matter divisions). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (noting how the interest extends only to the “particular right” owned); 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674 (“Each of the five 
enumerated rights may be subdivided indefinitely and . . . each subdivision of an exclusive right may be 
owned and enforced separately.”). 
 42. For an authoritative study of the bundle of rights conception and its stranglehold on property 
thinking, see generally J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 
(1996). 
 43. Id. at 734 (noting how under the disaggregative version, each “possible use” is itself treated 
as a property right) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the Act’s grant.44 Thus, the mere “right to sue” or the “right to enforce” the 
copyright could not on its own, be the subject of a transfer or assignment. 
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. is the leading case on this 
point.45 There, the plaintiff was the screenwriter for a television movie, 
copyright in which was owned (through the work-for-hire doctrine) by the 
producers.46 On discovering that the defendant’s work was substantially 
similar to hers, the plaintiff obtained an assignment from the producers to 
commence an action against the defendant. The transfer assigned to her “all 
right, title and interest in and to any claims and causes of action against” 
the defendants, as it related to the works in question.47 Hearing the appeal 
en banc, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the list of copyright’s exclusive 
rights contained in the Act was “exhaustive,” as a result of which the “bare 
assignment” of the right to commence an action for enforcement of 
copyright could not be validly assigned.48 The mere right to sue, in other 
words, could not be validly assigned or licensed. 
In light of the Act’s allowance for the infinite divisibility of its 
enumerated rights however, this restriction on the alienability of the right to 
sue is largely without teeth. Parties need merely create an artificially 
constructed assignment that relates to a narrow part of the right being 
infringed by the defendant, thereby effectively conferring on the assignee 
the right to bring an action against the defendant. In Silvers, the plaintiff 
would have thus needed to do no more than obtain a temporally 
circumscribed assignment of the right to make a cinematographic 
adaptation of the screenplay along the lines of the defendant’s movie. 
Given the court’s insistence on complying with the formal language and 
structure of the statute, this is likely to have passed muster with no 
problems.49 Infinite divisibility—along multiple dimensions—thus enables 
parties to create an artificial assignment that has the purpose and effect of 
doing no more than transferring the mere right to commence an action for 
infringement, a feature just waiting to be exploited by copyright trolls. 
3.  Statutory Damages 
While the law’s relaxed rules on standing and divisibility certainly 
 
 44. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B]. 
 45. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 46. Id. at 883. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 886–87, 890. 
 49. The court placed extensive emphasis on the structure and language of the statute, and the 
legislative history accompanying its enactment. See id. at 883–87. 
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facilitate the troll’s existence, the real inducement for its actions come from 
the Act’s rules on statutory damages, which render its business model not 
just viable, but also potentially lucrative. The Copyright Act allows the 
copyright owner in an infringement action to elect to receive “statutory 
damages” instead of actual damages.50 While actual damages are usually 
calculated on the basis of lost profits, statutory damages enable the court to 
award the owner a fixed amount, per work infringed, as it “considers 
just.”51 The statute further stipulates that this amount is to be between $750 
and $30,000 per work, circumscribing a court’s discretion by fixing both 
upper and lower limits for these damages.52 In addition, the Act also 
empowers courts to raise the award to as much as $150,000 per work when 
a plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the infringement was committed 
willfully.53 Courts have in turn interpreted the requirement of willfulness 
somewhat loosely, effectively converting the range of awards from $750 to 
$150,000 per work infringed.54 
Actual damages—compensatory in nature—make little sense for a 
copyright troll. Having no presence in the actual market for expression, 
whether as creator or distributor, it suffers no actual harm and loses no 
profits as such from the infringement. Yet, by allowing a copyright owner 
to elect to receive statutory damages that are in turn determined 
independent of any harm, while simultaneously curbing a court’s ability to 
lower the award below $750 per work, the Act effectively assures the troll 
of a meaningful recovery once an infringement is established. In addition to 
incentivizing the troll, the existence of such minimum mandatory statutory 
damages also induces potential defendants to settle their claims with the 
troll in advance of a court’s actual decision. Indeed, relying on statutorily 
prescribed damages was integral even to Harry Wall, the world’s first 
copyright troll.55 
When originally introduced (in 1909), the idea behind statutory 
damages was to enable courts to award damages in situations where it was 
exceedingly difficult or impossible to determine actual damages or lost 
profits.56 In situations where either actual damages or lost profits could 
 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[A]. 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 54. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[B][3][a]; Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 439, 441 (2009). 
 55. Alexander, supra note 26, at 339. 
 56. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 449. 
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indeed be proven, but were alleged to be inadequate (or in the nature of a 
loss rather than a profit to the defendant), courts often refused to award 
statutory damages.57 In contrast, under the 1976 Act, courts almost never 
question a plaintiff’s preference for statutory damages over actual damages 
and indeed often disregard the complete absence of any actual harm during 
the computation—which obviously favors trolls.58 
* * * 
In summary then, these three features of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
when combined together, create the ideal legal environment for the 
emergence of copyright trolls. Having existed since 1976, it is indeed 
somewhat surprising that it took nearly three decades for the first troll to 
emerge. And unsurprisingly, when it did, courts and defendants had few 
mechanisms with which to curb its activities. 
B.  THE CLAIM AGGREGATOR MODEL OF TROLLING: RIGHTHAVEN 
It was not until a few years ago that entities began to recognize the 
existence of a potentially lucrative business model hidden within the 
contours of the Copyright Act. While the label of “copyright troll” has 
come to be commonly attached to just about any entity that enforces 
copyrights,59 it is crucial to bear in mind that a troll—as understood here—
is one whose entire business revolves around the acquisition and 
enforcement of copyright in works created by others. A plaintiff-focused 
group of lawyers, for instance, might actively solicit copyright owners and 
assist them with the enforcement of their rights without actually acquiring 
any rights themselves in those works.60 While it may be rhetorically 
powerful to characterize these entities as trolls, the description is 
analytically faulty since these entities never enter the copyright system 
except in their capacities as lawyers. Never directly acquiring any claims, 
 
 57. Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (“Certainty that 
profits and damages are nil is not equivalent to difficulty in proving them.”); F. A. Mills, Inc., v. 
Standard Music Roll Co., 223 F. 849, 852 (D.N.J. 1915) (refusing to award statutory damages when the 
defendant made no profits from the infringement). Nimmer characterizes these cases as situations where 
“no injury” was established. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[F][1][a]. 
 58. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[A]. 
 59. See, e.g., Copyright Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues/ 
copyright-trolls (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (describing various copyright enforcement initiatives as 
“trolls”). 
 60. The United States Copyright Group (“USCG”) is a prime example of this. The USCG 
operates as a group of lawyers who approach various content owners offering to enforce their 
copyrights against online distributors for them. Id. Unlike trolls, USCG does nothing to acquire any 
ownership interest in the copyrights they actually enforce. 
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their participation in the copyright system is entirely indirect, that is, 
through the copyright owners whose claims they help enforce. The troll, by 
contrast, in acquiring claims from others, is endowed with a crucial level of 
autonomy in its decisionmaking. In other words, as owner of the acquired 
claim, the troll decides on its own—based on its own set of incentives—
which particular claims to enforce and against whom to so enforce them. Its 
enforcement calculus is thus effectively its own, which is not the case with 
entities merely assisting copyright owners with enforcement. Nonetheless, 
some of the concerns with copyright trolls do carry over to these entities as 
well. 
Commencing its operations in early 2010, Righthaven was perhaps the 
first entity to capitalize on copyright law’s lax rules on standing, 
assignment, and damages. This section begins by describing Righthaven’s 
business model and revenue-earning strategy, then looks at how courts and 
defendants addressed the question of fair use when dealing with 
Righthaven, and finally examines the strategy that courts and defendants 
eventually used to curb Righthaven’s activities. 
1.  Copyright Revenues in Four Simple Steps 
Describing itself as committed to “advancing the interests of copyright 
law,” Righthaven’s business model was premised on finding copyright 
owners who in principle wanted their rights enforced, but lacked the time, 
expertise, or willingness to do so themselves, or indeed the resources to 
hire outside lawyers for this task each time.61 Righthaven presented these 
owners with a third, more economically viable option: the transfer of a 
limited ownership interest in the content to Righthaven in order to enable it 
to enforce these rights against third parties using its own resources and 
expertise. 
Locating a Creator: The first step of its strategy involved locating a 
copyright owner willing to enter into a strategic partnership with it. 
Stephens Media LLC (“Stephens Media”), the owner of over seventy large 
newspapers across nine states, soon became its first partner.62 Both parties 
 
 61. See Dan Frosch, Enforcing Copyrights, for a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011, at B1 
(quoting Steve Gibson, CEO of Righthaven LLC, and discussing how some newspapers have formed 
business relationships with Righthaven after “grappl[ing] with how to protect their online content”), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/business/media/03righthaven.html?pagewanted= 
1&_r=1. 
 62. David Kravets, Righthaven Expands Troll Operation with Newspaper Giant, WIRED (Dec. 7, 
2010, 4:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/righthaven-expands-trolling/; Kravets, 
supra note 4. 
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entered into a “Strategic Alliance Agreement,” under which Stephens 
Media agreed to assign its rights in works that were copied by potential 
defendants to Righthaven for enforcement in court, and both parties also 
agreed to share the proceeds of any enforcement on a proportional basis.63 
This agreement also made explicit the artificial nature of the future 
assignments providing in no uncertain terms that Righthaven had no right 
or entitlement to exploit works or participate in their exploitation other than 
the right to recover any proceeds in an infringement action.64 
Finding a Copier: Having found a willing copyright owner, step two 
began with Righthaven policing the Internet and other publication media 
for unauthorized uses of Stephens Media’s works. Once it located an 
unauthorized use of a work—usually in the nature of a blog reproduction of 
text or photographs from a newspaper owned by Stephens Media—
Righthaven would then obtain an assignment of the specific work (or part 
of it) being reproduced from Stephens Media.65 In addition to covering 
only the work being copied, the assignment was also invariably 
retrospective in operation, allowing Righthaven to seek redress for “past, 
present, and future” infringements of the work.66 
Commencing the Action: In step three, Righthaven would bring an 
action for copyright infringement against the identified user of the work in 
federal court. Since most of its actions involved online reproductions that 
could be accessed anywhere, it chose the federal district courts of Nevada 
and Colorado for its actions.67 Typically, a copyright owner places at least 
some (even if not a large) value on getting the defendant to stop its 
infringing activities and to this end ordinarily sends the defendant a “cease-
and-desist” letter that first threatens legal action before actually bringing it. 
To Righthaven, a troll, curbing the defendant’s actions through such threats 
mattered very little. It therefore, in all but a very few of its cases, proceeded 
to commence an action against a defendant with absolutely no 
 
 63. Declaration of Laurence F. Pulgram in Support of Defendants’ Supplemental 
Mememorandum Addressing Recently Produced Evidence Relating to Pending Motions, Exhibit A at 
3–4, Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011) (No. 
2:10-cv-01356-RLH (GWF)), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53175589/Strategic-Alliance-
Agreement-Between-Righthaven-and-Stephens-Media. 
 64. Id. at 4. 
 65. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Exhibit 1 at 2, Righthaven LLC v. Dr. Shezad Malik 
Law Firm P.C., No. 10-cv-00636-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. dismissed Nov. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/36862835/Righthaven-Copyright-Assignment. 
 66. Id. 
 67. For a complete listing of its lawsuits, see Comprehensive List, supra note 13. 
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forewarning.68 And unlike the typical copyright owner, its primary focus in 
these actions was on obtaining an award of statutory damages, going as 
high as $150,000 per work when the infringement was alleged to be willful. 
Settling the Claim: In a large number of cases brought by Righthaven, 
the defendant simply chose not to litigate the claim, but to instead settle 
with Righthaven for a figure significantly lower than the maximum 
statutory damages it might have been required to pay if the matter had 
actually proceeded to trial.69 These settlements have averaged around 
$3500 per defendant.70 Righthaven’s collection strategy thus involved 
playing into potential defendants’ litigation and risk aversion. The 
collection strategy offered defendants the chance to settle for a lower (but 
nonnegligible) amount instead of having to risk a higher award and incur 
additional transaction costs in court. While the settlements may not have 
been independently lucrative, cumulatively they amounted to a lot given 
that Righthaven commenced over 275 cases of infringement.71 
2.  The Irrelevance of Fair Use in Theory 
Righthaven’s principal targets were individuals and groups that had 
posted copyrighted content on their websites or blogs without 
authorization. Very often, this involved more than just posting excerpts 
from the original articles and frequently entailed the verbatim reproduction 
of articles in their entirety. At first blush, it might seem like the fair use 
doctrine—copyright law’s primary safety valve—might have rendered 
these actions noninfringing. In reality however, the fair use doctrine was of 
little help to these defendants. 
Only ever rarely do courts find a defendant’s verbatim reproduction of 
a copyrighted work in its entirety to be a fair use. Merely because the use is 
for an informational purpose as opposed to a commercial purpose 
ordinarily does not render it a fair use under existing copyright law. 
Righthaven’s strategy relied entirely on this position and was well 
supported by prior cases in which bloggers had been found liable for 
posting content to their websites despite the noncommercial and 
 
 68. E.g., Kravets, supra note 4 (discussing how Righthaven brought an infringement suit prior to 
sending the defendant a takedown notice). 
 69.  Id. 
 70. See Steve Green, Righthaven Settles $150,000 Copyright Suit for $1,000, VEGAS INC. (July 1, 
2011, 1:55 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/jul/01/righthaven-settles-150000-copyright-suit-
1000/ (discussing three of Righthaven’s publicly reported settlement figures). 
 71. See Comprehensive List, supra note 13. 
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informational nature of their activities.72 Even though courts have observed 
that there may be instances where the reproduction of a work in its entirety 
can amount to a fair use, they have generally been reluctant to declare 
instances of simple verbatim reproduction as fair use.73 In hardly any case 
in which a defendant has reproduced a creative work in its entirety and 
without any significant transformation to it (for example, by way of 
commentary or criticism being added, or by giving the work a new 
purpose), has a court found the copying to be fair use.74 Thus, existing fair 
use jurisprudence seemed to favor Righthaven. 
Nonetheless, when they realized their inability to curb Righthaven 
under other principles, a few courts—desperate for a solution and finding 
none (see below)—began to interpret fair use in extremely liberal terms. 
These courts effectively exempted conduct that would have been 
considered infringement in relation to any other plaintiff.75 Relying on 
dicta that verbatim copying too could be fair use under circumstances, 
these courts placed significant weight on the noncommercial nature of the 
defendants’ activities76 and the lack of potential market harm to the owner 
as part of the fair use analysis.77 While this approach was limited to a few 
courts, it nonetheless made other copyright owners—that is, true creators 
and distributors—concerned about the expansive precedent being set.78 
This approach to the fair use doctrine ultimately failed to gain significant 
popularity given that courts and defendants in due course found another 
way to restrict Righthaven. 
Lastly, something must be said for the fair use doctrine’s inherent 
ambiguity and Righthaven’s reliance on this uncertainty to take advantage 
of potential defendants’ risk aversion. Structured as a common law-type 
four-factor inquiry, the fair use doctrine has long been criticized for 
 
 72. See, e.g., L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5669, at *6, *50–51, *75–76 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2000). 
 73. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:143 (2012). 
 74. See id. 
 75. E.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147–51 (D. Nev. 2011); 
Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111576, at *4–6 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2010); Righthaven LLC v. Klerks, No. 2:10-cv-00741-GMN-LRL, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105307, at *6–10 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010) (finding a sufficient meritorious fair 
use defense to set aside a default). 
 76. E.g., Klerks, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105307, at *7–8. 
 77. E.g., Realty One Grp., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111576, at *5–6. 
 78. See David Kravets, Righthaven Loss: Judge Rules Reposting Entire Article Is Fair Use, 
WIRED (June 20, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/fair-use-defense/ (noting 
how Righthaven plans to appeal the decision and that it is “not often that republishing an entire work 
without permission is deemed fair use”). 
  
2013] COPYRIGHT TROLLING 743 
offering potential defendants very little guidance in terms of their liability 
for copyright infringement.79 This uncertainty is thought to result in a 
heightened amount of risk aversion among copiers, who prefer to either 
license, settle, or worse still, refrain from using altogether the protected 
work in order to avoid time- and cost-intensive litigation.80 While neither 
the uncertainty nor the risk aversion is in any sense Righthaven’s creation, 
its strategy nonetheless drew obvious support from both features. The fair 
use doctrine, in short, was both useless to Righthaven’s defendants and 
structurally facilitative of Righthaven’s strategy. 
3.  Reining in the Troll 
While Righthaven enjoyed a good deal of success in its early actions, 
with time courts began to grow wary of its business model and litigation 
strategy, especially in light of the extensive criticism it began receiving. It 
was not until recently, however, that courts found a way by which to fault 
Righthaven for its model. During the course of its most recent suits against 
online copiers, it was discovered that the agreement between Righthaven 
and Stephens Media contained language that seemed to convey to 
Righthaven no more than the mere right to sue, which as discussed earlier, 
would have been ineffective at enabling Righthaven to bring its actions.81 
In Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground LLC,82 a district court 
in Nevada concluded that any actual assignment of copyright that 
Righthaven received from Stephens Media had to be understood and 
interpreted in light of the parties’ “Strategic Alliance Agreement” that they 
had entered into at the very beginning.83 The agreement provided in 
explicit terms that despite any assignment to Righthaven, Stephens Media 
was to retain the “exclusive license” to exploit the works in all forms, and 
that Righthaven was to have no rights other than the rights to recover from 
infringers.84 Relying on Silvers, the district court concluded that in light of 
this agreement, Righthaven’s eventual assignment left it with “nothing 
more than a fabrication.”85 Describing Righthaven’s claims to the contrary 
 
 79. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 
1495–1502 (2007). 
 80. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1284–
91 (2008); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 882, 887–906 (2007). 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48. 
 82. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011). 
 83. Id. at 972–73. 
 84. Id. at 972. 
 85. Id. at 973 (“In reality, Righthaven actually left the transaction with nothing more than a 
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as “disingenuous” and potentially “deceitful,” the court dismissed 
Righthaven’s suit, finding that it had no standing whatsoever to sue for 
copyright infringement.86 On learning about the strategic agreement, 
several other courts also either dismissed or stayed most of Righthaven’s 
remaining suits, in rather quick succession.87 
While the court may have been right in its interpretation of the 
agreement, its solution was entirely temporary. All that Righthaven needed 
to do to fix it and obtain legitimate standing for the future, was to modify 
the strategic agreement to convert the exclusive license retained by its 
client into a nonexclusive one and obtain exploitation rights to the work as 
well. In other words, the court had found a procedural flaw in Righthaven’s 
exploitation of a substantive loophole in the law. The former could be 
fixed, but not the second. Surely enough, Righthaven and Stephens Media 
modified their agreement along precisely these lines, thereby effectively 
remedying the lack of standing for future cases.88 In cases in which 
Righthaven had filed its complaint prior to the amendment however, courts 
refused to use the amendment to interpret the original agreement and 
continued to dismiss such cases for lack of standing.89 
Recognizing the futility of curbing Righthaven’s practices exclusively 
through copyright law, its opponents began looking elsewhere. Shortly 
after the dismissals, a group known as the Citizens Against Litigation 
Abuse (“CALA”) filed a petition in the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
arguing that Righthaven’s business model amounted to an “unauthorized 
practice of law,” since Righthaven was not, strictly speaking, a “law 
 
fabrication since a copyright owner cannot assign a bare right to sue after Silvers.”). 
 86. Id. at 973, 976. 
 87. Righthaven LLC v. Barham, No. 2:10-cv-02150-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66720, 
at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67181, at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1147. On appeal in two of these cases, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and validated the lower courts’ 
interpretation of the Strategic Alliance Agreement, and concluded that Righthaven lacked standing to 
commence an action for copyright infringement. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn (Hoehn II), 716 F.3d 1166, 
1169–72 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 88. David Kravets, Righthaven Says It Owns News Articles It’s Suing Over—for Real This Time, 
WIRED (June 24, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/righthaven-survival-bid/ 
(describing the amendment to the agreement). 
 89. See, e.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Mostofi, No. 2:10-CV-1066-KJD-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 75810, at *9–10, *13 (D. Nev. July 13, 2011) (“Here, Plaintiff and Stephens Media attempt to 
impermissibly amend the facts to manufacture standing. Therefore, the Court shall not consider the 
amended language of the SAA, but the actual assignment and language of the SAA as it existed at the 
time the complaint was filed.”); Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (“Even assuming that the [amendment] 
can change the jurisdictional facts as they existed at the time of the filing of the suit, it still does not 
correct the deficiencies with respect to lack of standing.”). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ 
refusal to interpret the original agreement in light of the amendment. Hoehn II, 716 F.3d at 1171–72. 
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firm.”90 In essence, the petition alleged that Righthaven was engaged in 
champerty and maintenance, practices long forbidden by the common law, 
in an effort to avoid third party encouragement for litigation.91 What is 
most intriguing about the petition, however, is that the core of the argument 
faulted Righthaven for its unethical as opposed to unlawful conduct. 
Describing it as “overreaching,” “bullying,” and “viciously attack[ing]” 
defendants, the petition seemed more intent on characterizing Righthaven’s 
actions as amounting to an unfair and unethical business model, rather than 
as a direct violation of any legal rule.92 
In due course however, Righthaven’s model began to fall apart. 
Shortly after courts began finding that it lacked standing to sue, Righthaven 
stopped commencing new cases and began laying off employees.93 In cases 
in which the court concluded that it had lacked standing to bring its suits all 
along and had thereby misled the court, Righthaven was fined and 
sanctioned for its actions, and ordered to pay its opponents’ full costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fees.94 When Righthaven failed to comply, the court 
ordered its assets to be seized and auctioned.95 Righthaven’s assets and 
domain name were then placed in receivership—and Righthaven 
effectively went under.96 
What Righthaven’s short-lived adventures reveal more than anything 
is the somewhat shaky legal foundation on which the case against copyright 
trolling—Righthaven’s principal activity—was built. In the end, 
Righthaven’s lack of standing hinged on an inadequacy in its agreement 
with Stephens Media, rather than a clear principle, theory, or doctrine. 
Arguments altogether missed the fact that Righthaven’s actions were 
 
 90. Petition for Original Jurisdiction at 4, Citizens Against Litig. Abuse, Inc. v. Righthaven LLC, 
(S.C. June 29, 2011), available at http://bloglawblog.com/docs/CALA_v_Righthaven_Supreme_ 
Court_Petition.pdf; Steve Green, Two Groups Ask High Court to Shut Down Righthaven in 
South Carolina, VEGAS INC. (June 27, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/ 
jun/27/two-groups-ask-high-court-shut-down-righthaven-sou/. 
 91. Petition for Original Jurisdiction, supra note 90, at 9–21. 
 92. Id. at 25–28. 
 93. David Kravets, Copyright Troll Righthaven Goes on Life Support, WIRED (Sep. 7, 2011, 
12:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/righthaven-on-life-support/. 
 94. Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124127, 
at *2–3 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 95. Steve Green, Marshals Ordered to Seize Righthaven Assets, VEGAS INC. (Nov. 1, 2011, 7:54 
PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/nov/01/marshals-ordered-seize-righthaven-assets/. 
 96. Steve Green, Can Righthaven Survive Latest Legal Blow, LAS VEGAS SUN (Dec. 13, 2011, 
2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/dec/13/can-righthaven-survive-latest-legal-blow/; 
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fundamentally problematic as a matter of copyright theory and policy.  
III.  THE PROBLEM WITH COPYRIGHT TROLLS 
In the end, courts were able to rein in Righthaven’s business model on 
the ground that it lacked standing since it had purportedly been given no 
more than the mere right to sue, which was insufficient to confer standing 
under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Silvers.97 District courts that invoked 
Silvers interpreted it as suggesting that an actionable claim for copyright 
infringement could not be alienated independent of some real right to use 
and exploit the work.98 Using this reasoning, the troll was thus faulted for 
attempting to trade in an independent market for copyright claims. Besides 
being unduly formalistic and therefore likely short-lived, this approach to 
regulating copyright trolling remains extremely myopic, missing some of 
the obvious benefits in allowing copyright claims to be traded. Not only 
does it misidentify the problem with copyright trolling, which is likely to 
undermine its effectiveness, but it also turns a blind eye to some of the 
benefits of third-party involvement in litigation funding, a practice that has 
started to gain significant momentum in numerous other areas.99 
The problem with copyright trolls, however, has little to do with the 
free alienability of actionable copyright claims. It originates instead in 
ideas that are fundamental to the existence and justification of the copyright 
system. Copyright law contains an enforcement optimality / equilibrium 
that originates in its structure as a private law mechanism. This equilibrium 
is very closely connected to copyright law’s fundamental social purpose—
namely, the inducement of creativity. The troll’s activities disrupt this 
equilibrium, but in so doing also run counter to copyright law’s basic goal, 
which is why its actions are seen as deeply problematic. 
Part III.A unbundles the connection between copyright law’s overall 
purpose and its private enforcement mechanism. Part III.B argues that this 
connection produces a hidden enforcement equilibrium between different 
types of copyright claims. Parts III.C and III.D then describe the way in 
 
 97. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 98. See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972–73 
(D. Nev. 2011). 
 99. For recent work documenting this trend, see Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A 
Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 92–101 (2010), and Maya Steinitz, Whose 
Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1275–85 (2011). For 
coverage in the popular media, see Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get 
Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/ 
15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all. For recent work extending this analysis to copyright law, see 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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which a troll’s actions are disruptive of both the equilibrium and the goals 
of copyright law. 
A.  THE PRESUMPTIVE ALIGNMENT OF THE INCENTIVES TO CREATE AND 
LITIGATE 
As a fundamentally utilitarian institution, copyright’s basic purpose is 
thought to lie in providing creators with a market-based inducement to 
create.100 Through its grant of a set of exclusive rights in a work of original 
expression, copyright law is thought to incentivize the very production of 
that expression.101 Justice Blackmun put it best when he unequivocally 
emphasized that “[c]opyright is based on the belief that by granting authors 
the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive to 
create.”102 Thus, the public welfare, manifested in the progress of the 
sciences and useful arts, is believed to be promoted by granting individual 
creators limited entitlements in their creations.103 This idea, often referred 
to as copyright’s incentives theory, is today taken to be the central dogma 
of U.S. copyright law. It routinely informs legislative activity in the area, 
and indeed motivates courts’ analyses and interpretation of copyright 
doctrine.104 
Put in simple incentive-based cost-benefit terms, copyright’s logic of 
incentives posits that creators are induced to produce creative expression 
because the benefits that they are likely to obtain from its grant of exclusive 
rights outweigh the costs incurred in the creative process.105 As rational 
actors, creators are thus motivated to create by this cost-benefit calculus, 
thereby enhancing overall social welfare. If B© represents the benefits 
likely to accrue to a creator from copyright (determined ex ante, at the time 
 
 100. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 
1577 (2009); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428 (2002); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1996). See also 
Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003) (hinting at the significance of 
incentives in copyright jurisprudence). 
 101. Balganesh, supra note 100, at 1577; Liu, supra note 100, at 428; Sterk, supra note 100, at 
1197. 
 102. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 104. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 105. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 38–39 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989) (“For a new work to be created, the expected return—typically, and we 
shall assume exclusively, from the sale of copies—must exceed the expected cost.”). 
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of creation), and CC represents the costs involved in the creative process, 
the copyright system is premised on the idea that B© must be greater than 
CC to generate the incentive to create. 
Beyond simply identifying the fact that copyright confers likely 
benefits on creators, the incentives theory pays little attention to the precise 
contours of those benefits and the ways in which their likelihood figures in 
creators’ calculations—assuming, of course, that the basic idea underlying 
the incentives theory holds true.106 Copyright certainly does not promise 
creators a viable market for their works. Works protected by copyright 
routinely fail in the marketplace, producing no tangible benefits to their 
creators. Yet, this is hardly copyright’s fault. On the other hand, what 
copyright promises to creators is best described as an assurance of market 
preservation—that is, the assurance that it will protect the creator’s market 
through its entitlement structure, regardless of how economically viable 
that market turns out to be. If market preservation forms the core of 
copyright’s promise to creators, much of its incentive then originates in the 
precise mechanism of preservation that it offers. Copyright law’s basic 
mechanism of market preservation remains its conferral of exclusive rights 
to copy the work, on creators. In granting creators exclusive rights in their 
works, it assures them that they alone will be able to exploit the market for 
copies of their works, however large or small that market may be. 
However, since expression is by its nature nonrivalrous, the functional 
significance of these exclusive rights emanates in large measure from the 
correlative duty that they impose on nonowners not to copy the work.107 
This point is best illustrated by a hypothetical. 
Consider an open area scattered with edible apples on the ground. In 
order to induce individuals to make effective use of these apples (and clean 
up the ground), assume that the law now creates a rule under which a 
person who expends effort to pick up an apple obtains the exclusive right to 
the apple. In this situation, a person who picks up an apple from the ground 
comes to be in de facto exclusive possession of it. Even though the act of 
picking it up imposes a duty on others to stay away from that apple once 
picked up, the functional value / significance of the exclusive right does not 
depend entirely on the duty for its functioning. The holder of the apple can 
simply take a bite of the apple after picking it up without having to assert 
any rights over it. Copyright law works almost exactly like this regime, 
 
 106. But see generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just 
Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011) (expressing skepticism about copyright’s 
fundamental theory of incentives). 
 107. Balganesh, supra note 19, at 1667–74. 
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except that the apple is replaced with a nonrival resource—namely, original 
expression. Once creators expend effort to produce original expression, 
they obtain an exclusive right to copy it. Since the expression is incapable 
of being possessed exclusively, the exclusive right is, however, only ever 
realized by disabling others from performing acts over which the owner is 
granted an exclusive right over, such as copying. This disabling dimension 
emanates from the duty that copyright law imposes on nonowners.108 
Copyright’s incentive structure—its market-preserving exclusive-
rights framework—is therefore heavily dependent on creating a correlative 
duty on others and then maintaining and enforcing breaches of this duty. 
Enforcing breaches of this duty, either directly through the law or in the 
shadow of the law, remains integral to the benefits of the exclusive rights 
that copyright law confers on creators. Yet, analyses of the benefits likely 
to flow from the copyright entitlement rarely ever look to the contingencies 
of enforcement, which obviously entails its own set of costs.109 To put the 
point more sharply, if a creator were granted an exclusive rights 
entitlement, but nonetheless realized that the enforcement of that 
entitlement was likely to be cost prohibitive and unviable, it would feed 
directly into the entitlement’s ability to induce creative expression.  
Assume a movie studio (the creator), ABC Inc., is determining 
whether to create a movie. It recognizes that the cost of making a motion 
picture is $2.5 million, but that it is likely to make at least $4 million in 
revenues through theatres and other forms of distribution. Now assume that 
ABC Inc. also recognizes that rampant copying of the movie on the Internet 
and by competitors is likely to diminish its revenues from the movie to zero 
by interfering with the public’s interest in going to movie theatres or in 
buying legal copies of the movie. The theory of incentives tells us that by 
promising creators like ABC Inc. that they have exclusive rights to make 
copies of their creation, copyright law enables them to exploit the full 
market potential of their works, effectively preserving their incentive to 
create. In our case, copyright therefore promises ABC Inc. that it will 
preserve its ability to earn revenue from its movie by rendering 
unauthorized copying actionable, and ABC Inc. estimates based on this 
promise that it can thereby obtain a net gain of $1.5 million. Copyright 
certainty does not promise ABC Inc. that it will actually earn $4 million, 
just that it will preserve ABC Inc.’s ability to do so by disabling 
unauthorized copying. Copyright is in effect preserving the entirety of ABC 
 
 108. Id.  
 109. See generally Kaplow, supra note 20 (identifying and discussing the different costs that 
private litigation entails, some of which are borne by the private actor, and others by society). 
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Inc.’s market, meaning that in this case B© ($4 million) > CC ($2.5 million), 
motivating ABC Inc. to make the movie. 
Now, ABC Inc. may also realize that copyright law’s mechanism of 
preservation, its promise of exclusivity, is heavily dependent on ABC Inc.’s 
being able to enforce the exclusive rights that it grants creators. Here, if 
enforcing copyright law to make sure that its revenues stay at $4 million 
(and preserve the market in its entirety) will likely take another $1.5 
million, ABC Inc. will have no incentive to create the movie, since it can 
calculate that its net gain will be zero. This suggests that the effective 
functioning of copyright as an incentive to create—in the standard 
incentives story—depends directly on the cost-effectiveness of 
enforcement. In other words, the costs (and benefits) of 
enforcing / litigating the claim are just as integral as the costs (and benefits) 
of creation to the copyright system’s realization of its fundamental 
utilitarian goal.110 
Two important qualifications are in order here. First, the argument 
above assumes that what are described as enforcement costs map onto 
litigation costs. One might argue that the exclusive rights could indeed be 
enforced independent of litigation—for example, through technological 
measures, cease-and-desist letters, and the like.111 It bears emphasizing that 
while these mechanisms may not constitute forms of “litigation” strictly 
speaking, their effectiveness is always dependent on eventual recourse to 
litigation. In other words, enforcement by self-help is always parasitic on 
the threat of eventual litigation and happens in the shadow of the law.112 As 
a result, ex ante calculations of enforcement must invariably consider the 
possibility of litigation. Second, copyright’s benefits can certainly be seen 
 
 110. In some ways, it is surprising that the litigation and enforcement costs of the copyright 
system have not been taken to impact its ability to function as an incentive to create. The analogous 
point has for long shown to be true in relation to the deterrence function of tort law, namely that when 
litigation costs are excessive, a regime of liability is likely to underdeter, since the incentive to take 
adequate precautions is reduced. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of 
Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 113–14 (1991); Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs 
on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 161 (1990) 
(developing a model to show how strict liability and negligence rules lead to underdeterrence when 
litigation costs are taken into account); Thomas J. Miceli, Deterrence, Litigation Costs, and the Statute 
of Limitations for Tort Suits, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 383, 393 (2000) (developing Hylton’s model 
further). 
 111. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1089, 1092–94 (1998); Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 397–
402 (1999). 
 112. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968, 997 (1979) (showing how interactions against the backdrop of 
a legal regime occur in “the shadow of the law”). 
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as entailing more than just the benefits of enforcing the entitlement. Since 
the entitlement is inherently marketable (that is, through licenses, transfers, 
and assignments), the very possibility of such contractual transfers might 
generate important benefits for the creator. The fact remains, however, that 
such purely contractual benefits are on their own likely to be fairly 
marginal when unbundled from the possibility of their enforcement. When 
contracting parties recognize that the possibility of the claim being 
enforced is cost prohibitive or unviable, the claim is likely to be valued at a 
much lower level, rendering its benefits to the transferor marginal. 
Returning then to the main point, that copyright’s incentive to create 
must factor in the incentive to litigate the copyright claim, allows us to now 
further specify the idea. Incentives to litigate a claim—for a rational private 
actor—can in similar terms be mapped onto the costs and benefits of a 
recovery. The benefits from litigation are thus the difference between the 
probabilistic expected recovery (or damages), and the costs of litigation, 
often represented by the formula113: BL = p(D) - CL, where BL represents 
the benefit from litigation or the expected value from litigation, p the 
probability of succeeding in a recovery, D the damages that the recovery is 
likely to result in, and CL the costs that the litigation entails. Only when this 
produces a positive yield for an actor, will it make sense to litigate.114 
If copyright law’s market-preserving benefits (previously B©) consist 
in large part of the benefits from enforcing / litigating the copyright claim 
(BL) and the marginal benefits that flow directly from the copyright 
entitlement (BDir), then the original calculus for the incentive to create (B© 
> CC) therefore becomes effectively: [BDir + p(D)] > [CC + CL]. In other 
words, for copyright to work as a rational inducement to create, the sum of 
the marginal nonenforcement benefits and the probabilistic recovery from 
enforcement must exceed the costs of creating the work and enforcing the 
claim. 
Copyright’s fundamental utilitarian goal of inducing creativity thus 
takes shape in significant part from the mechanism that the law sets up to 
enforce its grant of exclusivity to creators. The realization of this social 
goal is, as a result, contingent on the cost-effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanism for creators. Altering the costs, benefits, and probabilities of 
recovery thus affects not just the incentive to litigate, but presumptively the 
very incentive to create. In this respect, copyright law tracks other areas of 
 
 113. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 22 (2010). See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 882 (1998). 
 114. FARHANG, supra note 113, at 22. 
  
752 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:723 
law in which Congress seeks to motivate private actors to bring claims, in 
the belief that by so doing, a broader social goal is likely to be realized.115 
The reason this matters, we shall soon see, is because the copyright troll 
operates by driving a neat wedge between the two incentives, and in the 
process disrupts the continuity on which the regime is predicated. 
B.  SORTING COPYRIGHT CLAIMS—A HIDDEN EQUILIBRIUM 
In addition to relying on private enforcement to achieve its social goal, 
copyright also depends entirely on its private-law apparatus to realize an 
additional institutional function—namely, that of differentiating between 
various types of copyright claims. This function is in many ways parasitic 
on its social goal, but is nonetheless important to the smooth functioning of 
the system. In delegating the decision whether to enforce a claim against a 
copier to the copyright owner (the right-holder), copyright law allows right-
holders to decide precisely what kinds of claims they want to litigate and 
enforce. Yet, copyright’s delegation of this decision is not unbridled, for 
the decision derives from the variables that impact the decision to litigate, 
which are in turn under the control of the state.116 Given the regime’s 
purported realization of its social goal through litigation, this controlled 
delegation can be seen as emanating from the institution’s basic premise on 
the alignment of the incentive to create with the incentive to litigate. This 
framework requires some unbundling. 
“Not all copying, however, is copyright infringement.”117 Perhaps 
more importantly though, not all copyright infringement is likely to result 
in liability. This is because the decision whether to enforce a claim (and 
impose liability on a defendant) is very often influenced by costs and 
variables that make it both impractical and inefficient for the copyright 
owner to commence an action.118 Putting these two concepts together, we 
see that potential copyright claims can thus be categorized, broadly 
speaking, into three basic categories. 
Actionable and Enforced Claims (Type I). This category covers claims 
that constitute acts of infringement as a legal matter and which are in fact 
 
 115. Id. at 30–31. 
 116. Indeed, some argue that statutory regimes which delegate their enforcement to private actors 
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enforced by the copyright owner because it makes economic sense to 
enforce them. Paradigmatic of this category are instances of competitive 
copying, where the copyright owner suffers direct, recurring harm.119 The 
action is commenced upon the recognition that the potential recovery is 
very likely to exceed the harm from allowing the copying to continue 
unabated. 
Actionable but Tolerated Claims (Type II). This is the most important 
category for our purposes and covers claims that as a matter of law 
constitute infringement, but are nonetheless treated as nonactionable by 
copyright owners through their conscious inaction. Tim Wu calls uses that 
form the basis of these claims “tolerated uses” and posits that they come 
about when the copyright owner chooses not to enforce its rights for 
reasons of “simple laziness or enforcement costs, a desire to create 
goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement . . . actually benefits the 
owner.”120 Examples include copying by fan fiction websites, or the private 
home copying of literary, musical, or audiovisual works by consumers.121 
Nonactionable Claims (Type III). These are typically instances of 
copying that the law (as opposed to the individual copyright owner) treats 
as noninfringing to begin with. The most prominent claims in this category 
are instances of fair use, which the law treats as independently 
legitimate.122 Also included are instances of copying that do not meet the 
“substantial similarity” requirement,123 and forms of copying under a 
statutory exemption124 or implied license.125 The key analytical point here 
is that these claims are rendered nonactionable as a matter of law. Private 
parties, in other words, have little say in expanding or contracting this 
category.126 
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What is crucial for our purposes, however, is the fact that copyright 
law—in its reliance on private enforcement—actively delegates to 
copyright owners the process of categorizing claims into the first two 
categories, that is Types I and II. As between Types I and II on the one 
hand, and Type III on the other, the law gives copyright owners no 
discretion whatsoever, and instead treats the classification as mandatory. 
Between Types I and II however, copyright law (that is, doctrine) says 
nothing at all. The decision is an entirely private one and resembles the 
gatekeeping function that ownership performs in property law.127 Just as a 
property owner gets to decide who to treat as an uninvited but welcome 
guest and who to treat as a trespasser, copyright owners get to choose what 
kinds of uses (and hence claims) to treat as actionable and enforced, as 
opposed to actionable but tolerated.128 
This raises the obvious question then of identifying the criteria by 
which copyright owners separate these claims and how they make the 
decision to enforce some but not all. Here, we return back to the factors 
that influence the decision whether to litigate / enforce the claim to begin 
with. The decision to litigate is contingent upon the expected benefit from 
litigation exceeding its expected costs, or the costs of litigation when 
subtracted from the probabilistic recovery of damages producing a positive 
payout to the plaintiff: p(D) > CL, since BL = p(D) - CL.
129 On the 
continuing assumption that the decision whether to commence an 
infringement action or not is a rational economic one, we may readily 
conclude that when p(D) < CL, these claims fall into the category of 
actionable but tolerated. 
What is important to recognize is that the variables in question, 
namely, the costs of litigation, the probability of success, and the damages 
recoverable are not necessarily individual to each plaintiff, but instead 
develop a level of uniformity over time. For instance, the litigation costs 
involve, among other things, the cost of finding a lawyer, paying the 
attorney’s fees for representation, paying the court fees, the costs of 
negotiating a settlement, and the indirect costs that litigation entails (for 
example, involving reputation, goodwill, and the like). These are often 
independent of an individual plaintiff and also show a surprising level of 
consistency across diverse subject matter. As a result, sorting between 
 
Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 68 (1999). 
 127. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 289 
(2008). 
 128. Id. at 289–90. 
 129. FARHANG, supra note 113, at 22. 
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Type I and Type II claims begins to occur as a system-wide phenomenon, 
rather than an individual one. In other words, certain kinds of claims begin 
to fall into Type II rather than Type I because it makes little economic 
sense for a rational, individual utility-maximizing plaintiff to enforce them, 
regardless of the specifics of the plaintiff and defendant. An example best 
illustrates this point. 
Jason is an amateur artist. Enamored by a movie poster for the movie 
Avatar that he comes across, he decides to paint an oil reproduction of the 
poster at home. He buys an authorized copy of the poster and produces 
three oil paintings that are each virtually identical to the original. He hangs 
each up in a different room of his house for his friends to admire when they 
visit him. As a purely doctrinal matter, Jason’s actions do not fall under any 
of the copyright statute’s exemptions from infringement, including the fair 
use doctrine; meaning it is in theory actionable.130 Now assume that one 
day, a representative of the movie studio Lightstorm Entertainment—which 
owns the rights to the original poster—visits Jason. Will Lightstorm likely 
choose to enforce its claim against Jason? 
Clearly not. As a rational actor, Lightstorm will realize that: 
(1) Jason’s actions were not for profit and did not produce a negative 
market effect (harm) on the sale of its own poster; (2) a court / jury is likely 
to be sympathetic to Jason’s “personal use” of the protected work (the 
probability of recovery, p, say hypothetically is thus closer to 0.4);131 
(3) even if it succeeds, and elects to recover statutory damages (since there 
are no actual damages), its recovery (D) will likely be closer to the 
minimum $750, since proving that Jason’s actions were willful is extremely 
difficult;132 and (4) the costs of hiring a law firm, initiating the action, and 
going through the litigation will likely be (hypothetically) at least $5,000 
(CL). Putting it all together, enforcing the claim will come at a net loss of 
$4,700 (5000 - (.4)750), giving Lightstorm no incentive to enforce the 
claim. Over time though, the same type of calculation is likely to be applied 
by a majority of copyright owners to most types of personal home 
reproductions of protected works—making it highly unlikely that such 
claims will be enforced and effectively pushing such uses into the category 
of actionable but tolerated uses. 
 
 130. See Litman, supra note 121, at 1903 (describing such acts as infringing in the “nominal” 
sense). 
 131. Id. at 1878–79 (describing a personal use as one in which “even the most rapacious copyright 
owners have always agreed that some uses are lawful even though they are neither exempted or 
privileged in the copyright statute nor recognized as legal by any judicial decision”). 
 132. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
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One might worry that if the costs of litigating / enforcing the claim in 
such Type II claims is prohibitive, it might affect Type I claims as well—
effectively interfering with the incentive to litigate, which as we saw, feeds 
into the very incentive to create. This is where Congress and the federal 
courts have the power to step in and alter the calculus, as they deem 
necessary.133 Through modifications in the law, they can alter the expected 
recovery (D), the probability of such recovery (p) and the costs of 
litigation, so as to ensure that at any point in time there remains a balance 
between Type I and Type II claims, making it viable for some copyright 
claims to be brought and enforced, in turn furthering copyright’s purpose of 
motivating creativity. This point bears emphasis for it reveals two 
extremely important things about the enforcement of copyright claims: 
first, that the balance between Type I and Type II claims is realized through 
private copyright owners’ calculations of when it makes economic sense to 
enforce; and second, that Congress and the courts are always in a position 
to influence this balance through changes in the law, if and when they find 
that the balance is impeding copyright’s social purpose of inducing 
creativity. 
Copyright law at all times contains a balance not just between Type I 
and Type III, or actionable and nonactionable claims, but also a balance 
between Type I and Type II, or actionable and enforced, and actionable but 
tolerated claims. As long as the expected benefits for potential Type I 
claims are significant enough, the incentive to create continues to be 
fuelled by copyright. When Congress and the courts have reason to suspect 
that the balance is problematic such that it is likely to impact the incentive 
to create, they alter the variables. A case in point is Congress’s introduction 
of statutory damages into the Copyright Act in 1909, when it recognized 
that copyright owners were finding it “difficult to prove how much damage 
they had suffered.”134 Presumably then, Congress realized that this 
difficulty was expanding the scope of Type II claims—since it affected the 
variable p(D)—and chose to fix it in an effort to push claims back into the 
category of actionable and enforced. 
What this reveals is that copyright law as a structural matter, contains 
an underappreciated enforcement equilibrium, manifested in the ratio of 
Type I to Type II claims. This equilibrium is maintained entirely through 
the rational economic decisions of private copyright owners, with periodic 
support and tailoring from Congress and the federal judiciary. By ensuring 
 
 133. See FARHANG, supra note 113, at 24–28 (showing how Congress can do this in numerous 
domains). 
 134. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 446. 
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that the costs of bringing certain kinds of claims—measured in terms of 
primary litigation costs, and the secondary reputational, social, and long-
term market consequences of such actions—exceeds any likely recovery, 
copyright law ensures that certain kinds of claims remain de facto lawful, 
even when legally actionable. Indeed, this balance is precisely why we 
have a host of “gray area” uses that while infringing in the nominal sense 
are nonetheless rampant.135 
As a species of transaction costs, litigation costs are routinely taken to 
be wasteful, and worthy of being minimized (if not eliminated).136 Yet, 
much like positive transaction costs, which can produce certain beneficial 
outcomes contextually,137 positive litigation costs are responsible for the 
Type I / Type II equilibrium, which injects added breathing space into any 
private enforcement regime. Positive litigation costs, in other words, 
perform an important “cautionary function,” by forcing plaintiffs to assess 
the costs and benefits of their actions before enforcing their claims.138 This 
cautionary function in turn produces beneficial spillover effects to the rest 
of society, manifested in the maintenance of a large set of Type II claims. 
What is perhaps most important to appreciate about this equilibrium, 
which may seem otherwise uncontroversial, is that it forms an essential 
boundary condition for copyright’s functioning as an incentive to create. In 
other words, it represents a calibration of the amount of incentive—in 
terms of the expected value from copyright—needed to stimulate creativity. 
This calibration, however, is done by copyright owners themselves in the 
aggregate. This is where the fact that the equilibrium originates entirely in 
the aggregated calculations of private copyright owners over time, while 
supported by alterations in the law as circumstances change, assumes 
significance. This certainly is not to suggest that the equilibrium never 
changes. Indeed, quite independent of legislative activity (which is in some 
sense responsive to the demands of private actors), private actors can 
themselves come to recognize that the balance of Type I to Type II claims 
is inappropriate (that is, inadequate) to serve as an inducement for 
creativity. When this occurs, copyright owners begin to alter their calculus, 
 
 135. Wu, supra note 21, at 633. 
 136. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A 
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 410 (1999); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of 
Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1685 (1989). 
 137. For the leading account on the contextual benefits of positive transaction costs, see David M. 
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 85–103 (2005). 
 138. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) (describing 
how consideration in contract law acts as a “check against inconsiderate action”). 
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often ignoring the costs of enforcing previously tolerated claims and 
incurring short-term losses to instigate long term benefits. A prime example 
of this phenomenon is the recording industry’s campaign against file 
sharing.139 
In 2003, as the practice of peer-to-peer file sharing started becoming 
common among college and high school students, recording studios began 
to worry that such digital downloads would diminish their revenues from 
regular sales.140 Individual actions against downloaders had until then 
remained a paradigmatic Type II, or actionable but tolerated claim, since 
the recovery was costly and had little expected value.141 Nonetheless, 
recording studios under the rubric of the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”), decided that there remained a hidden benefit to such 
otherwise economically inefficient lawsuits—namely, their deterrent effect 
on other potential downloaders.142 The recording studios thus made the 
calculation that even if bringing the individual lawsuits proved inefficient, 
it was likely to generate quantifiable long-term benefits that might render it 
worthwhile in due course. Between 2003 and 2008, the RIAA then 
commenced about 18,000 lawsuits against downloaders at a huge loss, but 
which they hoped would deter further downloading on peer-to-peer 
networks.143 Evidence seems to suggest that this campaign had little to no 
deterrent effect on individual downloaders, with the RIAA eventually 
abandoning the campaign.144 Nonetheless, the concerted action by the 
copyright owners did have the effect of altering the equilibrium of 
nonenforcement for peer-to-peer private copying, which had until then 
been tolerated. Scholars referred to this as a “historical shift” that occurred 
 
 139. For some literature documenting this, see Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s 
Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
725, 744–50 (2005); Litman, supra note 121, at 1876–77; and Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 958 (2005). 
 140. See David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED 
(May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/ (noting how the 
campaign began in September 2003). 
 141. Litman, supra note 121, at 1877. 
 142. Id.; Hughes, supra note 139, at 744. 
 143. Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA Sued 18,000 People . . . or 35,000?, ARS TECHNICA (July 8, 
2009, 11:50 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/has-the-riaa-sued-18000-people-or-
35000.ars; Kravets, supra note 140; Mike Masnick, RIAA Spent $17.6 Million in Lawsuits . . . to Get 
$391,000 in Settlements?, TECHDIRT (July 14, 2010, 9:44 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
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 144. Mike Masnick, Defining Success: Were the RIAA’s Lawsuits a Success or Not?, TECHDIRT 
(June 7, 2010, 11:15 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100606/2308559704.shtml (arguing that 
the campaign was not a success). But see Litman, supra note 121, at 1877 (discussing the deterrent 
effects of infringement lawsuits against potential downloaders). 
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in copyright enforcement145—brought about entirely through the action of 
owners. They had thus succeeded in altering the equilibrium, by moving 
such downloading from Type II to Type I, independent of its effect on 
deterrence and social norms among downloaders.146 Individual home 
downloading is today viewed as likely to trigger an infringement action. 
Despite the fact that the equilibrium of Type I and II claims plays an 
important role in constituting the incentive that copyright law creates, it has 
thus far received little attention in attempts to understand copyright’s 
incentive framework. The “incentives-access” framework first developed 
by Arrow is thought to inform standard economic accounts of copyright 
law;147 and yet, few recognize that actionable but tolerated claims play an 
important role in framing the boundary between incentives and access, 
which has traditionally been thought to derive entirely from copyright 
law’s doctrinal filters between protectable and unprotectable material.148 
The typology and equilibrium described here reveal that the balance is 
maintained not just by protectability, but also by enforcement levels. 
Note that thus far, we have avoided much discussion of nonactionable 
claims, of which fair use claims are the most common. The problem with 
fair use however is that given its uncertainty, its borders remain unclear.149 
As a result, while much of what is colloquially understood as fair use 
represents Type III, some of what is taken to be fair use is in reality Type 
II. Given that the decision whether something is in Type II or instead in 
Type I (and therefore enforced) is entirely a private decision delegated to 
copyright owners, potential defendants have little ability to contribute to 
the scope of Type II claims on their own. This is another way of saying that 
the balance between Type I and Type II claims is entirely a factor of costs 
and benefits specific to potential plaintiffs, which reveals its stability over 
time. Once again, Congress and the courts can of course, carve certain 
claims out of Type II and put them into Type III, and indeed they have 
done so in the past. 
 
 145. Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright 
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2005). 
 146. See Litman, supra note 121, at 1877 (describing possible effects on deterrence and personal 
uses). 
 147. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617 
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 148. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 484–90 (1996) (discussing the balance between incentives and access). 
 149. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 121, at 1873–74 (discussing some of the unclear applications of 
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C.  THE EQUILIBRIUM AS A FOCAL POINT 
The balance between Type I and Type II claims described above—the 
“equilibrium”—is more than just a descriptive reality of the copyright 
system. It is also of deep functional significance to the institution, which 
makes its erosion through artificial mechanisms troubling. The importance 
of balance in copyright law is hardly new and is well documented in the 
literature.150 Given that copyright protection produces large costs over 
time, the importance of safety valves to minimize the system’s costs to 
society has for long been seen as essential to its functioning and legitimacy. 
Fair use, the idea-expression dichotomy, originality, and a host of other 
devices internal to copyright doctrine are thus seen as performing this 
balancing function.151 
While the Type I / Type II equilibrium contributes in a similar vein to 
copyright’s basic ideal of balance, in turn central to the incentives-access 
tradeoff that economic accounts of copyright law rely on,152 there is also 
something fundamentally different (and important) about it. Since it 
originates in market-based calculations that copyright owners themselves 
are forced to make over a period of time, the balance partakes of a 
“spontaneous order,”153 analogous to customary regimes in which 
participants have greater control over the content of the rules that govern 
them. The balance thus assumes a different kind of normativity from the 
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one ordinarily communicated and enforced by the rest of copyright law.154 
As a private law institution, copyright law is structured to speak 
through relational directives of rights and duties. Being an obligatory (as 
opposed to optional) regime, its private law architecture is composed of a 
set of “exclusive rights” that operate through their correlative duties “not to 
copy” and compels individuals to behave, or refrain from behaving in 
certain ways.155 Copyright’s legal rules therefore communicate a formal 
legal normativity, largely analogous to other areas of law. By declaring 
certain actions to be within the exclusive providence of the copyright 
owner, the law directs others not to engage in those actions and subjects 
them to the possibility of legal liability if they choose not to comply. 
The Type I / Type II equilibrium however is devoid of any formal 
normative significance. Being neither a direct nor delegated creation of the 
law, but rather a reality of the enforcement environment, its status is more 
de facto than de jure. This hardly suggests that it is not of great importance. 
To the contrary, it performs a crucial coordination function in the creative 
marketplace as a “focal point” for interactions between copyright owners, 
users, and copiers. 
The typical interaction between a copyright owner and a private 
(noncommercial) copier in the marketplace can be understood as one of 
coordination, rather than pure conflict. A coordination situation (in Game 
Theory) is one where the interests of parties are aligned to some degree 
(even if not completely), and yet this fact alone does not ensure that they 
will act to further their aligned self-interest.156 The literature is replete with 
examples of such coordination: cars on a street seeking to proceed in an 
orderly and efficient manner; rowers on both sides of a boat seeking to 
move the boat in the same direction; hunters trying to catch a common 
prey; and so on.157 Users and copiers care deeply about many of the uses 
that fall into the category of “actionable but tolerated” (or “tolerated”), 
since they contribute to the effective consumption and use of creative 
works. Indeed, some scholars describe the allowance for such uses as an 
integral part of the free speech and liberty interests that users have, even if 
 
 154. For copyright’s traditional normativity, see Balganesh, supra note 19, at 1677–82 
(identifying the normative justifications for why copying is a wrong). 
 155. Id. at 1667–74. 
 156. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655 
(2000) (“In a coordination game, players have common interests, but this fact does not guarantee that 
the players will do the best they can for themselves.”). 
 157. Id. at 1655–58. 
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copyright law treats them as formally actionable.158 Copyright owners also 
remain indifferent to such uses as we discussed, so long as they do not eat 
into their revenues (that is, as long as they remain within the zone of 
tolerance), for example, by turning commercial or competitive. In some 
instances, copyright owners might not just be indifferent to such uses, but 
might instead seek to encourage them—given their spillover effects on the 
primary market for the work in question (for example, fan fiction or 
sampling).159 The two sides’ interests are thus aligned, but absent some 
formal communication, there is no guarantee that they will coordinate—
that is, copyright owners will refrain from enforcing their claims, and 
private users will use and consume the work within the zone of 
tolerance.160 
In such situations needing coordination, scholars have posited that 
very often “focal points” tend to spontaneously emerge, either through the 
interaction of parties over time or through a third party, which has the 
effect of making some information salient, thereby inducing the 
coordination that both parties desire.161 What is critical to appreciate 
though is that these focal points need not be endowed with any normative 
significance for them to work.162 All that they do is raise the salience of one 
option over others, causing parties to converge around that option.163 The 
focal point thus generates credible expectations on each side as to the 
behavior of the other, which allow them to move forward collectively.164 
Since focal points do not work through their formal normativity, their 
origins matter very little. A focal point might thus originate in a third party 
(for example, a government) or indeed through the action of one side of the 
interaction over time. It is precisely in this manner that the equilibrium 
described before operates. 
Over a period of time, when copyright owners decide not to enforce 
certain kinds of actionable claims (Type II claims), it has the effect of 
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communicating a signal to users and copiers. While it certainly does not 
carry any normative significance in the sense of binding the copyright 
owner, it nonetheless assumes a certain amount of salience that is sufficient 
to enable owners and users to coordinate their actions.165 Copyright 
owners’ behavior over time thus creates a self-fulfilling expectation that 
behavior of a certain kind will occur, even if it is not formally obligatory. It 
creates a credible expectation that certain kinds of unauthorized copying 
and use on the part of the public will likely not be enforced against them, 
even though such enforcement is permitted as a formal legal matter. 
Indeed, the significance of such Type II uses, despite their 
nonobligatory status, was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. 
of America, Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. otherwise known for its 
doctrine of substantial noninfringing uses in the area of contributory 
liability.166 There, the Court noted how significant it was that several 
copyright owners readily testified (at trial) that they viewed certain kinds of 
copying as permissible.167 It thus noted that one prominent copyright owner 
“had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use” and 
that numerous such owners had no objection to, and indeed “welcome[d]” 
such copying for various reasons.168 Particularly telling is the Court’s 
conclusion that “the owner of a copyright may well have economic or 
noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur” and 
that “[i]t is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best way 
for them to exploit their copyrights.”169 The Court repeatedly emphasized 
that it was using these findings not to accord the behavior normative 
significance—for example, as a collective implied license—but instead to 
conclude that such uses were de facto noninfringing because of the 
copyright owners’ own inaction, which the users and copiers of the 
protected work could legitimately rely on.170 In other words, the Court too 
seems to have thought the existence of Type II claims and the identification 
of the demarcating line between Type I and Type II to be both salient and 
behavior influencing as a focal point. Indeed, the Court’s own recognition 
and validation of such uses can be seen as giving it additional prominence 
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and salience to this end. 
Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, who is commonly credited with 
developing the idea of focal points, observes that a “prime characteristic” 
of such focal points is that they introduce an element of “prominence or 
conspicuousness” into the situation—one that depends on “time and place 
and who the people are.”171 “[W]ho the parties are and what they know 
about each other” is thus an extremely important determinant for the 
emergence and continuing significance of such focal points.172 The credible 
expectation that a focal point creates is thus heavily dependent on one party 
being able to understand the reasoning and thinking that goes into the 
other’s decision, which is in turn dependent on the characteristics and 
incentives of both sides remaining relatively static over time, place, and 
context. In our situation, members of the public who seek to use 
copyrighted works must thus be able to understand how (and perhaps why) 
copyright owners will not enforce Type II claims, for the equilibrium to 
operate as a focal point and vice versa, which in turn necessitates a set of 
minimum shared characteristics on both sides. Indeed, it is precisely this 
element that the troll’s actions alter, in the process changing both the 
equilibrium and its ability to operate as a focal point for coordination 
between owners and copiers. The next section details this process. 
D.  THE COPYRIGHT TROLL, THE ENFORCEMENT EQUILIBRIUM, AND THE 
UNEASE 
To this point, we have avoided any discussion of the copyright troll 
and its interaction with the enforcement equilibrium built into copyright 
law. It is precisely because of the existence of this equilibrium that the 
troll’s actions start to become problematic. Its unique set of market 
motivations and structural features turn the equilibrium—fragile, unstable, 
and dependent on private actors—on its head. In the process, it risks 
disrupting the connection between copyright enforcement and the 
institution’s fundamental purposes of inducing creativity through the 
market. 
When the copyright troll steps into the shoes of the copyright owner 
by acquiring an actionable copyright claim, it brings several of its 
advantages to the enforcement game. The first is its expertise in enforcing 
copyright claims. The troll is usually comprised of individuals with 
experience enforcing and litigating copyright claims—that is, copyright 
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lawyers. As a result, the transaction costs of initiating the claim decrease 
quite dramatically, eliminating the need for external counsel altogether. 
Second is its reliance on scale. To the copyright troll, the substance of an 
individual claim matters much less than its aggregate returns from the 
enforcement of multiple claims. This explains why it is able to settle each 
claim for amounts much lower than the damages it seeks. Yet, when 
aggregated together, the settlements prove to be beneficial. Third, the 
copyright troll focuses entirely on its short-term gains from enforcement. 
Not being a participant in the market for creative works, and therefore with 
no customer base as such, it has little to worry about in terms of the 
reputational consequences of going after defendants indiscriminately and of 
suing parties who to traditional copyright owners constitute their 
customers.173 
Going back then to the incentive to enforce a claim, represented by the 
idea of BL = p(D) - CL, what we begin to see is that the copyright troll is 
able to quite significantly lower its litigation costs (CL) because of its cost 
efficiencies and expertise, and at the same time raise its probability of 
success (p), once again owing to its expertise and systematic enforcement, 
altering its expected payoff from the enforcement of the claim. Its expected 
benefits from litigating / enforcing the claim (BL) are thus significantly 
higher than that of the original copyright owner, that is, the creator, as a 
result of these features. The reason this matters, however, is because it has 
the effect of altering the balance between Type I and Type II claims 
described earlier.174 Recall that what held the balance between the two 
categories was the fact that at some point, for a large variety of claims p(D) 
< CL, and as a result of which, those claims are not litigated / enforced.
175 
This too, however, is hardly problematic, for as we noted earlier, the 
equilibrium is hardly immutable, and copyright owners do occasionally try 
to change the balance when they feel like the incentive provided by Type I 
claims is insufficient.176 In this sense, the troll’s actions are no different 
from an otherwise overzealous copyright owner, such as the RIAA, 
described earlier.177 What differentiates the troll from the copyright owner, 
however, is that its reasons for not adhering to the balance are not germane 
 
 173. See Hughes, supra note 139, at 727–28 (2005) (explaining that “conventional wisdom” 
warned against suing one’s customers); Fred von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, 
LAW.COM (Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005540575&Is_Suing_Your_ 
Customers_a_Good_Idea (evaluating the success of lawsuits against peer-to-peer file sharing). 
 174.  See supra Part III.B. 
 175.  See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 176.  See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 140–46. 
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to copyright’s fundamental purpose. 
As noted earlier, the balance between Type I and Type II copyright 
claims can be seen as an essential boundary condition for the incentive to 
create that copyright law provides creators.178 In other words, copyright 
owners treat some claims as Type II, the point at which the returns from 
enforcement are no longer deemed necessary for the inducement of creative 
expression. Over time, this might change through the actions of copyright 
owners, and when it does, the logic is normally that the marketplace for 
creative expression necessitates higher expected returns, pushing tolerated 
Type II claims into the category of enforced Type I claims in order to 
produce those returns. While the balance between Type I and II claims is 
changed through the concerted action of copyright owners in certain 
domains, the copyright system ordinarily views that change as 
unproblematic because it is taken to be a mere recalibration of the returns 
needed to induce creativity, which the law delegates to copyright owners 
themselves.179 Thus, when recording companies (copyright owners) start 
enforcing infringement claims against noncommercial downloaders, the 
system is compelled to see it as unproblematic because it is thought to 
represent the fact that the copyright owners are merely reassessing an 
equilibrium that represents the returns needed to continue producing music. 
Given the connection between the incentives to create and enforce 
described earlier, an increase in the costs of creating new works (CC) 
necessitates greater cumulative recovery (p(D)), which accounts for the 
change.180 In short, since copyright’s fundamental purpose is thought to lie 
in providing creators with an inducement to produce original expression 
through the market, alterations in the balance between Type I and Type II 
claims that derive from that purpose remain unproblematic. 
The troll’s attempt to change the balance, however, has very different 
origins. The troll’s impetus for enforcing claims that would have otherwise 
been actionable but tolerated originates not in the increased costs of 
creating new works (CC)—since it obviously plays no role in the creation of 
the work—but is instead a result of its ability to reduce its own litigation 
costs (CL) and enhance its chances of recovery (p(D)), both of which raise 
its expected payoffs from enforcing / litigating a copyright claim. To the 
 
 178.  See supra text accompanying note 133. 
 179. Cf. Hughes, supra note 139, at 737, 743 (observing how the U.S. market for music sales 
“contracted significantly” from 1998 to 2003, the period immediately prior to when the RIAA began to 
commence hundreds of user lawsuits). 
 180. See id. at 744–46 (discussing how the recording industry’s legal actions could be creating an 
optimal point). 
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extent that the balance between Type I and Type II claims is not just a 
contingent part of copyright’s incentive structure, but is instead integral to 
its very functioning, the troll’s disruption of the balance can be seen as 
emanating from reasons external to copyright’s basic purpose of producing 
creative expression. It is precisely this aspect of copyright trolling that 
differentiates it from any other attempt to overenforce copyright claims. 
The real problem with the copyright troll thus lies in its disruption of the 
balance between actionable and enforced (Type I) and actionable but 
tolerated (Type II) claims for reasons that have nothing whatsoever to do 
with copyright’s functioning as an incentive to create.181 
The troll’s actions produce obvious harm for defendants who, relying 
on the earlier equilibrium, perceived their actions to be actionable but 
tolerated. The troll however does more than just render the actions of a few 
defendants infringing and subject to liability. If allowed to continue 
unimpeded, the troll’s actions would disrupt not just the equilibrium as it 
exists at any given point in time, but also the very process by which the 
equilibrium forms and functions as a mechanism of coordination. Therein 
lies the real danger that trolling poses for the effective functioning of the 
copyright system. 
The equilibrium functions as a focal point because of its ability to 
generate credible expectations for both copyright owners and copiers as to 
the other’s behavior. The identities of parties, as noted earlier, plays a 
major role in the development of such a focal point.182 When the copyright 
troll enters the enforcement game and begins to enforce its right 
indiscriminately, and by reference to its own set of motives and incentives 
(which are different from traditional creator-owners), it affects the ability 
of the equilibrium to function as a credible commitment from copyright 
owners across a variety of domains and contexts. Users and copiers of 
works whose actions would fit into the category of Type II claims now 
 
 181. A good analogy here is to the recent modifications to the copyright system that have in 
similar fashion been thought to alter copyright’s balance. The retroactive term extension of twenty years 
brought about by the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
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been amended by Congress on numerous occasions, but because the extension to the exclusive rights 
entitlement (by twenty years) was seen as bearing no connection at all to copyright’s fundamental 
purpose. It was precisely because there was no evidence (or claim) that the extension was connected to 
copyright’s inducement to create new expressive work, that many considered the CTEA deeply flawed. 
Indeed, this formed the very basis of the unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the CTEA. See Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210–12 (2003) (“[P]etitioners argue [the CTEA] does not stimulate the 
creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created.”). 
 182.  See supra Part III.C. 
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have to worry that the very identity and reasoning of copyright owners has 
changed, moving a greater number of Type II claims into Type I. Being 
devoid of formal normative significance—that is, in not binding the party 
generating the signal—the focal point begins to lose its salience as a 
mechanism of coordination. With this development, the possibility that 
Type II claims and the uses that they represent will disappear altogether 
begins to loom large. 
This lack of formal normativity is, unfortunately, also the reason why 
the troll’s behavior is hard to fault as a matter of copyright law. Strictly 
speaking, the troll has done nothing unlawful. Its actions are fully in 
compliance with copyright law’s rules on transfers, standing, and recovery 
of damages.183 Yet, its actions have the potential to disrupt an informal 
dynamic in copyright law that is just as integral to the institution as its 
formal framework of exclusive rights, privileges, and immunities. This, in 
turn, explains why the case against copyright trolls is rather difficult. Since 
its actions relate to an informal, uncodified part of the copyright system, 
reining it in as a matter of formal law presents a host of challenges. Any 
doctrinal tool employed to this end is likely to be either over- or 
underdeterminative. 
Take for instance the two approaches that courts used to rein in 
Righthaven. Some courts expanded fair use to cover the defendant’s actions 
of reproducing an article in its entirety.184 In so doing, these courts 
effectively moved certain Type II claims into Type III simply in order to 
disallow a recovery and preclude the troll from moving the claims into 
Type I. Until this point, no court had ever concluded that such verbatim 
copying could amount to a fair use. Consequently, these decisions surprised 
both copiers and copyright owners, who quite legitimately viewed it as a 
doctrinal aberration motivated by the courts’ purpose.185 A few other 
courts, as noted before, invoked the Silvers rule to deny Righthaven formal 
 
 183. See supra Part II.B. 
 184. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (D. Nev. 2011). 
 185. See, e.g., Steve Green, Book, Record Industries Attack Righthaven Fair Use Ruling, VEGAS 
INC. (Dec. 5, 2011, 9:26 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/dec/05/book-record-industries-
attack-righthaven-fair-use-/ (describing the amicus curiae brief of copyright owners opposing the Hoehn 
decision’s expansion of fair use). For an exhaustive treatment of the interrelation between copyright 
trolling and fair use, see Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (making the normative case for copyright trolls to establish the 
absence of fair use as a solution to the problem). It is worth noting that the district court’s expansive 
interpretation of fair use was eventually vacated by the Ninth Circuit when it concluded that 
Righthaven’s suit could be dismissed for lack of standing. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn (Hoehn II), 716 
F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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standing to sue for infringement.186 Yet, as discussed, this approach can be 
overcome by a tightly worded artificial assignment. In short then, the 
absence of a viable doctrinal solution to the problem is a reflection of the 
reality that the problem with the copyright troll is (1) entirely one of 
copyright theory and policy that (2) is not formally embodied in copyright 
law. The challenge thus lies in formulating a legal response that can 
account for this reality, to which the next part turns. 
IV.  CURTAILING COPYRIGHT TROLLING DIRECTLY: 
“COMPENSABLE HARM” 
Having identified the real problem with copyright trolls to lie in the 
fact that their reasons for enforcing copyright claims diverge rather 
significantly from the institution’s fundamental purpose, this part moves to 
the prescriptive and suggests mechanisms by which copyright trolls can be 
controlled. In specific, any solution to the problem of copyright trolling 
needs to focus directly on policing the entity’s motives and reasons for 
enforcing copyright claims, while at the same time ensuring that it does not 
(1) alter the contours of copyright’s traditional doctrines (such as fair use), 
or (2) preclude a secondary market for copyright claims from developing 
altogether. The approaches that courts currently adopt tend to do one or the 
other, making them unviable as long-term solutions to the problem. 
This part argues that a direct, more tailored solution lies in a rule that 
introduces a heightened rule of standing for nonauthor plaintiffs, by 
ensuring that the basis of their legal claims, in theory, tracks those of actual 
authors-creators, who copyright law is primarily designed to serve. Such a 
rule would require (1) nonauthor plaintiffs (for example, trolls) who in 
infringement claims (2) elect for statutory damages (as opposed to actual 
damages or injunctive relief) to establish that the defendant’s actions would 
in principle have enabled a claim for “actual damages”187 and / or 
attributable profits, the type of injury that copyright law’s statutory 
damages allowance was “intended to prevent.”188 In other words, it would 
make the availability of statutory damages for nonauthor plaintiffs depend 
 
 186. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1144–47; Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground LLC, 791 
F. Supp. 2d 968, 973, 975 (D. Nev. 2011). See also Righthaven, LLC v. Barham, No. 2:10-cv-02150-
RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66720, at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011) (finding Righthaven lacked 
standing based on the same analysis used in Democratic Underground and Hoehn); Righthaven, LLC v. 
DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67181, at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 
2011) (same). 
 187. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 188. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (applying 
antitrust law). 
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on their establishing the existence of some compensable harm. 
A.  A LIMITED ANALOGY TO THE ANTITRUST INJURY RULE 
Scholars commonly make reference to antitrust law’s “antitrust 
injury” rule to suggest that copyright law ought to incorporate an 
equivalent rule of standing to limit plaintiffs’ claims to situations that relate 
to copyright’s core objective of inducing creativity through the market.189 
While no doubt well intentioned, this argument is hard to square with 
copyright’s basic structure as a strict-liability tort. My claim here is, by 
contrast, quite different. Subsequent interpretations (and applications) of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc.,190 which is credited with formulating the antitrust injury rule, make 
the claim that the Court was attempting to lay down a formal rule of 
standing for all private plaintiffs in antitrust cases.191 Whether this is 
accurate or not, the Court’s opinion in Brunswick also sheds important light 
on how a federal statute’s remedial provisions ought to be understood and 
interpreted, when the statute specifically contemplates private actions and 
the realization of a public goal through such actions. This interpretive 
approach should inform how courts approach the question of when 
plaintiffs should be allowed to invoke copyright law’s allowance for 
statutory damages. 
Brunswick involved an action brought by a few individual bowling 
centers, complaining that the defendant’s acquisition of a few other centers 
in the region was in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, which regulated 
anticompetitive mergers.192 The defendant was the largest owner-operator 
of bowling centers in the region. The action was brought under § 4 of the 
Act, which allowed a plaintiff to recover “threefold the damages” (treble 
damages) upon establishing that it had been “injured in its business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”193 Speaking 
for a unanimous Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall concluded that § 4 
 
 189. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and 
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 979–80 (2010) (proposing a “serious harm requirement” in copyright 
cases); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 933–34 (2007) (noting 
that, like antitrust law, copyright law “recognizes that some harms are not cognizable”); Shyamkrishna 
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Competition, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 345, 346 (2008) (commenting on the analogy to the 
“antitrust injury rule”). 
 190. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
 191. 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA et al., ANTITRUST LAW 73 (3d ed. 2007). 
 192. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479–80. 
 193. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
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needed more than just any causal connection between the merger and the 
plaintiffs’ injury, since mergers by their very nature cause some 
dislocation.194 Instead, the plaintiffs needed to show “injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”195 In other words, the causation 
required to allow the claim had to originate in antitrust law’s fundamental 
purpose of avoiding anticompetitive behavior and effects. Thus emerged 
antitrust law’s “antitrust injury” rule, which has since become a formal 
doctrine of standing in antitrust law. 
Many scholars have suggested that copyright law (and indeed perhaps 
all of intellectual property law) would stand to benefit from a similar injury 
requirement—and that courts should allow copyright claims only when 
plaintiffs succeed in showing harm to their incentives to create or distribute 
the work in question.196 While this would certainly render nonactionable a 
large number of copyright claims that do not directly further social welfare 
by inducing creative expression, it is also likely to dramatically alter the 
analytical structure of copyright law. 
Liability for copyright infringement has always been seen as strict in 
the sense that it requires neither a showing of fault nor proof of actual 
harm.197 Making liability now depend on proof of injury is likely to alter 
the contours of liability not just as a procedural matter (that is, as to 
standing), but as a substantive one as well. As a private law regime, 
copyright law depends entirely on private enforcement via infringement 
suits for its functioning. Unlike antitrust law, in which private actions are 
one of several forms of enforcement,198 the very existence and validity of a 
copyright claim is dependent on a copyright owner’s ability to enforce it. In 
the antitrust context, when a private plaintiff’s claim is dismissed under the 
antitrust injury rule, it never precludes various other forms of enforcement. 
As a purely analytical matter then, the underlying violation (of antitrust 
laws) is not automatically legitimized since public enforcement continues 
to remain viable. In copyright law, on the other hand, precluding an 
infringement claim when proof of harm is lacking would serve to validate 
the defendant’s actions given the absence of alternative enforcement 
 
 194. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487. 
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mechanisms.199 To the extent that copyright law is meant to operate as an 
inducement to create, to the creator who understands that as a functional 
matter the very existence of the entitlement is heavily dependent on proof 
of harm, the rule is likely to impede the system’s operation. A full-blown 
copyright injury rule—modeled on antitrust law’s antitrust injury 
requirement—would operate as a substantive, rather than procedural bar. 
And certainly for our purposes, it is likely to do much more than just curtail 
trolling, since it would effectively alter all claims for copyright 
infringement. 
A more modest use of the antitrust analogy, however, also derives 
from Brunswick. What analogies to Justice Marshall’s opinion routinely 
ignore is the extent to which he focused on the remedial nature of the treble 
damages provision that was in question.200 In other words, the opinion was 
motivated in large part by the Clayton Act’s purported fusion of 
compensatory and punitive (deterrent) objectives into the damages 
provision, which in turn necessitated a rule that would unbundle the two. 
Justice Marshall observed in Brunswick, 
 Section 4, in contrast [to Section 7], is in essence a remedial 
provision. It provides treble damages to “[a]ny person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
antitrust laws . . . .” Of course, treble damages also play an important 
role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have 
frequently observed. It nevertheless is true that the treble-damages 
provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties, and 
measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is 
designed primarily as a remedy.201 
Justice Marshall was clearly observing that the Act’s damages 
provision served two separate functions: a compensatory one and a punitive 
one. Indeed, Congress’s conflation of the two played an important role in 
the Court’s analysis when it went on to further note, 
The discussions of [the treble damages remedy] on the floor of the 
Senate indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a remedy for “[t]he 
people of the United States as individuals,” especially consumers. Treble 
damages were provided in part for punitive purposes, but also to make 
the remedy meaningful . . . .202 
 
 199. To put the point in terms of a distinction drawn earlier, it would effectively remove acts of 
copying that do not cause harm to the plaintiff out of the category of Type I claims, but its effect would 
not just be to move it into Type II, but rather Type III—that is, noninfringing claims. 
 200. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 485. 
 201. Id. at 485–86 (citations omitted). 
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The antitrust injury rule was thus motivated primarily by the concern 
that allowing a plaintiff to rely on a loose idea of causation, even if 
demanded by the punitive dimension of the remedy, would dilute the 
remedy of its compensatory significance. Despite later courts’ extension of 
the logic to other antitrust remedies, the Brunswick Court saw its rule 
intricately tied to the treble damages recovery being invoked. It thus 
concluded that  
for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they 
must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the 
market [but instead an] antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.203  
Had the plaintiff been seeking just an injunction, one doubts that the Court 
would have insisted on the same rule, even though later courts have 
extended Brunswick in that direction. 
Brunswick was thus in the end about standing for a damages recovery 
that combined compensatory and punitive purposes. It provides us with a 
narrower, and more direct framework with which to think about the 
primary motivation of the copyright troll, namely copyright’s statutory 
damages provision. 
B.  A RULE OF STANDING FOR NONAUTHOR PLAINTIFFS SEEKING 
STATUTORY DAMAGES 
Statutory damages were introduced into U.S. copyright law for the 
first time in 1909.204 The primary reason for their introduction was to aid 
courts and litigants in situations where it was difficult to prove and quantify 
actual damages and lost profits.205 In attempting to facilitate the recovery of 
actual damages through a fixed amount, their original purpose was thus 
compensatory in nature.206 While the 1909 Act’s statutory damages 
provision authorized courts to make awards that they considered just, the 
law also set a range for such awards and provided suggested awards for 
common types of infringements.207 Perhaps most importantly though, the 
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statute specifically provided that statutory damages were “not [to] be 
regarded as a penalty,” thereby seemingly endowing them exclusively with 
a compensatory dimension.208 Thus, courts routinely refused statutory 
damages awards when plaintiffs could establish actual damages and lost 
profits.209 
In revising the statute in 1976, Congress altered much of this. In 
addition to modifying the range for awards, the law eliminated suggested 
awards amounts and the explicit recognition that awards were not to be 
considered penalties.210 In due course, courts came to interpret the new 
provision, § 504(c), as consciously embodying a punitive dimension in 
addition to a remedial or compensatory one.211 Yet, since statutory 
damages were intended as replacements for actual damages, they continued 
to serve their core compensatory purpose while accommodating a punitive 
one. In effect, the compensatory and punitive or deterrent dimensions came 
to be merged in practice, especially toward the higher end of the permitted 
range, that is, for willful infringements.212 
Much like antitrust law’s treble damages rule, copyright law’s 
statutory damages provision blends compensatory and punitive purposes 
into a single award. Especially since an election for such damages forms an 
alternative to actual damages or lost profits, the compensatory dimension of 
making the plaintiff whole in situations of injury continues to form at least 
part of the rationale for the provision. Given this reality, courts ought to 
scrutinize the election for statutory damages more closely, so as to ensure 
that the compensatory purpose is not lost altogether. Indeed, this is the 
modest lesson that can be taken away from Brunswick. 
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Section 504(a) of the copyright statute allows a plaintiff in an 
infringement suit to elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual 
damages or lost profits at any time before the final judgment is 
delivered.213 In its compensatory dimension, the provision operates in 
largely evidentiary terms—either allowing the plaintiff to prove actual 
damages (and lost profits) or to avoid this burden by settling for an amount 
within a specified range. To ensure that the compensatory dimension is 
indeed at play—which Congress never sought to eliminate—courts should 
scrutinize a plaintiff’s election more closely to ensure the existence of 
actual damages or “any additional profits of the infringer” so as to trigger 
the very need for damages. In other words, since the statutory damages 
provision was intended to aid courts in their computation for compensatory 
damages, courts ought to satisfy themselves as to the need for such 
damages before proceeding to its computation within the prescribed range. 
In situations where the court finds no basis for compensation (no actual 
damage suffered), the need to invoke a computational aid ought to 
disappear, since the primary logic for damages as a category disappears and 
punitive damages are by and large impermissible without compensatory 
damages.214 
Indeed, the idea of scrutinizing the basis of and need for the plaintiff’s 
election has been suggested before. In arguing for reforming copyright 
law’s statutory damages provision, Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland 
exhort courts to “[a]sk the parties to offer proof of damages and profits, or, 
in the alternative, to demonstrate why damages or profits are sufficiently 
difficult to prove.”215 They continue on to note that Congress consciously 
chose to avoid requiring plaintiffs to offer such proof but seems to have 
contemplated an award of no more than the statutory minimum when the 
plaintiff fails to offer such proof of actual damages.216 Accordingly, they 
would have courts award the prescribed minimum statutory damages when 
the plaintiff has lost no profits or suffered no actual damage.217 The 
 
 213. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006). 
 214. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001) (explaining 
that in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate, courts should forgo mathematical 
calculations and instead examine (1) the degree of “reprehensibility or culpability,” (2) calculate “the 
relationship between the penalty and the harm to the victim,” and (3) compare the sanctions imposed in 
similar cases); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–83 (1996) (same). But see Abner v. 
Kan. City S. R.R., 513 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that punitive damages could be awarded 
without compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act because of an explicit provision in the Act 
that enabled such awards). 
 215. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 502. 
 216. Id. at 502 n.313. 
 217. Id. at 501. 
  
776 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:723 
Samuelson-Wheatland proposal, while aimed at ensuring greater scrutiny 
of a plaintiff’s election, does not quite convert the scrutiny into an actual 
prerequisite for recovery. 
Interposing Justice Marshall’s logic from Brunswick into this 
framework however moves us in the direction of a formal rule of standing. 
As noted previously, Brunswick can be seen to stand for the idea that in 
dealing with a mixed damages provision in a statute (that is, where both 
compensatory and punitive purposes are blended), the court should ensure 
that the compensatory purpose is being directly served—in a manner 
intended by the statutory framework—before allowing the award. In the 
copyright context, this should mean that when a court has reason to suspect 
that a plaintiff’s election for statutory damages is not as a computational 
aid, but is instead a cloak for some recovery, it should deny the election of 
the statutory damages. Instead, the court should tie the recovery to any 
actual damages sustained, without which, the plaintiff should be unable to 
recover. In effect, this would work as an injury requirement for plaintiffs 
seeking to invoke the statutory damages remedy. At the same time, for 
plaintiffs that are initial owners of the copyright—such as 
authors / creators—this rule of standing might be relaxed for two 
interconnected reasons. 
First, given copyright’s purpose of creating an ex ante incentive to 
create original works of authorship, the very act of infringement—once 
identified—can be seen to operate as a valid basis for presuming potential 
market harm.218 Since the insistence on a plaintiff’s proving actual 
damages is meant to work as a proxy for injury, it ceases to remain 
necessary when such injury is known to exist in certain domains. Put in 
opposite terms, one could argue that the very availability of statutory 
damages operates as an ex ante incentive to create for authors, which in 
turn ought not to be disturbed.219 Second, going back to the connection 
between the incentive to create and the incentive to enforce, requiring a 
 
 218. Indeed, the absence of market harm is often dispositive in fair use cases. Consequently, if a 
court were to find a defendant’s copying to be infringement—and not fair use—it is reasonable to infer 
the existence of potential market harm. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 566–67 (1985) (explaining that because infringement cases will rarely present clear evidence of 
actual damage, “once a copyright holder establishes with reasonable probability the existence of a 
causal connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the 
infringer to show that this damage would have occurred”). 
 219. Indeed this point is consistent with the Court’s expansive interpretation of copyright law’s 
structure as an incentive to create. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 (2003) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the CTEA and arguing that Congress may have passed the CTEA in order to 
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plaintiff to adduce evidence of actual harm as a precondition for recovery 
would undoubtedly raise the costs of litigation (CL). Without a 
corresponding rise in benefits, it would undoubtedly modify the incentive 
calculus, altering the Type I / Type II claim equilibrium in one domain, 
which could in turn produce effects in others. In other words, by pushing 
some claims from Type I to Type II—which the rule could result in for 
creator-plaintiffs—it might conversely result in moving other types of 
claims from Type II to Type I to balance out the effects of the rule. 
The rule of standing would thus operate only in relation to elections 
made by noninitial copyright owners, a class recognized by the copyright 
statute itself.220 Indeed the Copyright Act itself treats authors as a special 
class and vests them with additional protection, in the nature of inalienable 
termination rights in the interests of fairness.221 There should thus be little 
reason in exempting author-plaintiffs from a formal rule of standing when 
they invoke the statutory damages provision. In short, the logic of 
Brunswick and the purpose behind copyright law’s provision on statutory 
damages allow courts to impose on nonauthor plaintiffs in infringement 
suits who elect to recover statutory damages, the burden of showing the 
existence of some actual damages or lost profits before validating the 
election. 
This rule raises the obvious next question of precisely what a 
nonauthor plaintiff will need to show to establish that some actual damages 
are, in principle, recoverable. As Nimmer notes, “Actual damages represent 
the extent to which infringement has injured or destroyed the market value 
of the copyrighted work at the time of infringement.”222 At its simplest, the 
“basic rule for computing injury to the market value of a copyrighted work 
arising from infringement is to inquire what revenue would have accrued to 
plaintiff but for the infringement” and to place the burden on the plaintiff 
“of establishing with reasonable probability the existence of a causal 
connection between defendant’s infringement and loss of anticipated 
revenue.”223 In situations in which lost revenue is hard to quantify and the 
defendant has no attributable profits to speak of, some courts look to the 
“value of use” in their assessment, that is, they equate actual injury with the 
likely cost of the infringing use to the defendant had permission been 
sought.224 Note that for our purposes, the quantification of these harms is 
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irrelevant, since what matters is their very existence, and once shown to 
exist, the nonauthor plaintiff may conveniently elect for statutory damages. 
Requiring nonauthor plaintiffs to establish some basis for actual 
damages before their election is validated would thus operate as a rule of 
substantive standing that comports with copyright’s fundamental 
institutional purposes. It would operate as the perfect antidote against the 
copyright troll, by rendering its business model unviable—an issue to 
which we return. 
C.  DETERRING THE TROLL 
A formal rule disallowing a nonauthor plaintiff from electing for 
statutory damages (under § 504(c)) without proof of compensable harm 
operates as a direct, targeted measure that is likely to impede copyright 
trolling. What is crucial to appreciate about this strategy though is that it 
operates by affecting the core motivation of the copyright troll, namely its 
reliance on copyright’s statutory damages provision. Unlike a formalized 
denial of all standing to sue—such as the expanded Silvers rule—the 
version offered here does not formally prohibit trolling, but instead deters 
it. In other words, it focuses on eliminating the troll’s basic incentive that 
drives its business model. Without the automatic availability of statutory 
damages, the troll will have absolutely no guarantee of legal recovery. 
Since the troll will in most cases be unable to establish any compensable 
harm as such, its ability to recover damages will be dramatically impeded. 
Knowing this to be the case, trolls are unlikely to pursue defendants that 
copyright owners are unlikely to have gone after themselves (for example, 
noncommercial defendants or those engaging in purely personal uses), 
thereby aligning the ability to obtain statutory damages with copyright’s 
basic a priori incentive structure to litigate the claim. 
None of this is to suggest that this strategy is foolproof. Copyright 
trolls might choose to take their chances and hope that defendants are risk 
averse enough to settle even without a valid claim for statutory damages. 
While this might have limited payoff in the short run, it is unlikely to be a 
viable model once a defendant emerges who is willing to test the troll’s 
claim and have it adjudicated in a court. 
The situation in which the compensable harm prerequisite is more 
likely to be insufficient involves defendants that have an interest in 
continuing their use of the work. In other words, when a defendant has 
something to lose from being enjoined from copying, a troll could in theory 
choose to seek a permanent injunction by way of remedy and use the threat 
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of such an injunction to obtain a hefty settlement from the defendant—
which would operate as a licensing fee of sorts.225 This too is unlikely 
because the grant of injunctive relief is predicated on a plaintiff being able 
to show a likelihood of irreparable injury without such relief.226 
The first requirement that courts of equity look to before granting 
injunctions is the requirement that the plaintiff establishes that an ordinary 
legal remedy—namely compensatory damages—will not adequately repair 
the harm. While the rule diminished in significance in the last century, the 
last few years have seen its revival following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., which held that courts have to look 
to equity’s traditional requirements, including the irreparable-injury rule, 
before granting injunctive relief. 227 While eBay dealt with permanent 
injunctions in patent cases, its logic and reasoning apply with equal force to 
copyright law and preliminary injunctions as well, and indeed later courts 
have extended it in that direction.228 In essence, the irreparable-injury rule 
prohibits courts from presuming that an injunction ought to follow merely 
because a plaintiff establishes ownership of copyright and an infringement. 
It needs to be additionally satisfied that damages are not sufficient. 
One of the ways in which courts have historically satisfied the 
irreparable injury requirement is when damages are too difficult to measure 
accurately.229 Here, however, courts are required to invoke the logic of the 
compensable harm requirement suggested for statutory damages.230 Merely 
because damages cannot be adequately measured should not imply that 
courts do not satisfy themselves of the existence of compensable harm for 
such damages to begin with.231 In other words, the gist of eBay is that a 
court cannot presume irreparable harm merely because a right is violated, 
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but instead needs to be convinced that such harm does in fact exist or is 
very likely.232 Consequently, the copyright troll is unlikely to succeed in 
merely replacing its quest for statutory damages with injunctive relief and 
going after defendants that intend to continue using the work. Courts are 
likely to insist on a showing of actual or potential harm—which the troll is 
unlikely to satisfy by merely pointing to presumptively lost licensing 
revenue. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Today, the copyright troll is a common bogeyman used to illustrate 
the innumerable problems that underlie our copyright system. In the 
process, discussions of copyright trolling all too readily ignore the 
mechanisms of copyright law that motivate trolling and the precise reasons 
why copyright trolling is fundamentally problematic. This in turn has 
courts and scholars developing antidotes to copyright trolling that are 
ineffective, short-lived, overexpansive, or which in their myopic focus on 
the consequences of trolling, end up foreclosing potentially important 
developments in the copyright system. 
In this Article, I have argued that copyright trolling remains a deeply 
problematic activity, but for reasons that have little to do with fair use or 
the acquisition of copyright claims by third parties. Copyright law, as an 
inducement for creativity, is premised on the connection between the 
incentive to create and the incentive to enforce actionable claims. It 
contains an important balance between claims that are enforced and those 
that are tolerated despite their being actionable as such. Very importantly, 
this balance is realized by the private enforcement decisions of copyright 
owners over time. As an entity having no interest in the creation, 
distribution, or use of creative works, yet motivated to enforce copyright 
claims relating to such works in a dogmatic manner, the copyright troll 
disrupts this informal, unwritten, and fragile equilibrium. In the process, it 
detaches the enforcement side of copyright from its functioning as an 
inducement to create. What makes its actions additionally troublesome is 
the fact that in disrupting this informal equilibrium, its actions nonetheless 
comply perfectly with all of copyright law’s formal rules. This is precisely 
what makes the case against copyright trolls complicated. 
Despite having risen to prominence only recently, the conceptual and 
analytical tools that make trolling possible have been in existence since the 
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Copyright Act of 1976. The Righthaven episode brought home—to courts, 
lawyers, and the public—the speed and effectiveness with which copyright 
trolls could operate, and the powerlessness of courts to deal with the 
phenomenon. While Righthaven may have ended its operations, it is 
certainly only a matter of time before an entity learns from Righthaven’s 
mistakes and picks up where it left off. When that occurs, courts and 
policymakers will do well to fully appreciate what copyright trolling is and 
is not, and why it is that trolling is detrimental to the copyright system, 
before formulating a response to it. Failing such an approach, copyright 
trolls will have little reason to worry about their future. 
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